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I. INTRODUCTION
More than four decades ago, in 1969, the New York State Leg-
islature enacted Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act, Article 17-A (17-
A) authorizing a Surrogate to appoint a guardian over the person
and/or the property of a person with mental retardation. At the
time, various organizations and advocates for this population, pri-
marily parents and parent organizations, voiced the need for an
abbreviated proceeding for individuals with mental retardation
when they reached the age of eighteen.1 The underlying assump-
tion was that the mentally retarded were perpetual children,2 such
that the legal powers all parents had over persons under eighteen
should simply be extended indefinitely for the parents of the men-
tally retarded; 17-A was the outcome.3 In 1989, despite a substantial
change in the understanding of disability, including intellectual
and developmental disability, now based on a social, rather than a
medical model, and without any significant discussion, S.C.P.A. Ar-
ticle 17-A was amended to include other “developmental
disabilities.”4
1 At that time, the only vehicles available for substituted decision-making were the
committee and conservator proceedings of Articles 77 and 78 of the Mental Hygiene
Law (“M.H.L.”).
2 See generally, Janice Brockley, Rearing the Child Who Never Grew: Ideologies of Parent-
ing and Intellectual Disability in American History, in MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA,
130 (Steve Noll & James Trent, Jr. eds. 2004).
3 See Rose Mary Bailly & Charis B. Nick-Torok, Should We Be Talking? Beginning a
Dialogue on Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 807,
817-19 (2012).
4 1989 N.Y. Sess. Laws 675 § 2 (McKinney).
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In 1990, the legislature directed a study to re-evaluate Article
17-A in light of changes in the “care, treatment and understanding
of these individuals,”5 as well as “new legal theories regarding the
rights of such individuals.”6 Proposed amendments were to be sub-
mitted to the legislature by the close of 1991.7 Rather than altering
17-A, however, the New York State Law Revision Commission ex-
amined adult guardianship issues and proposed Mental Hygiene
Law (“M.H.L.”) Article 81 (Art. 81), which was enacted in 1992 and
which became effective in 1993.8 Apparently, a good deal of work
was done on 17-A, and an extensive draft report with recommenda-
tions produced, but that draft never saw the light of day, and 17-A
remains essentially unchanged today.9
The need for reconsideration, reform, or possibly even repeal
is, however, greater than ever. There have been changes in the law,
in other states and federally, as well as an evolution in constitu-
tional principles and a burgeoning human rights movement. The
population of persons covered by the now outdated term “mental
retardation” and the preferred term developmental (or intellec-
tual) disabilities10 has exploded, making issues relating to their
5 Nationally, the Developmental Disabilities Act, first enacted in 1963, was also
the subject of updating based on these concerns. With the last significant amend-
ments in 2000, changes in the “landscape” of developmental disability have been de-
scribed as follows:
The [Developmental Disabilities] Act, in conjunction with activities of
self-advocates, families, other advocacy groups, state and local govern-
ments, and other stakeholders, has changed the way people with [devel-
opmental disabilities] live. The social landscape in the United States has
shifted from a place where people with [developmental disabilities]
were unheard and neglected to a country where far fewer people are
relegated to institutional care, children with [developmental disabili-
ties] are in public schools, adults are living and in some cases working in
the community, and a bourgeoning self-advocacy movement is demand-
ing that people with intellectual and developmental disabilities have
power over their own lives.
Rising Expectations: The Developmental Disability Act Revisited, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABIL-
ITY, (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2011/Feb142011, archived at
http://perma.cc/T9FD-76L6.
6 L. 1990, ch. 516, § 1.
7 Id. at § 4.
8 Bailly, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y., Book 34A
Mental Hyg. § 81.01.
9 One major change was the addition of provisions allowing guardians to make
end-of-life decisions for their wards. See N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1750-b and discus-
sion in Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 3, at 820. The general provisions of 17-A re-
mained the same.
10 See discussion infra at 12. The preferred term is “People with Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities” (“PWIDDS”), which will be utilized here, except where
specific references to the existing statute are involved.
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protection and rights an increasingly central question in legal and
bio-ethical discourse. As in 1990, there have, as well, been signifi-
cant social and cultural changes in the “care, treatment and under-
standing of such individuals.” Rethinking this clearly outdated
statute is, thus, clearly both necessary and overdue.11
This Report is intended to start the conversation about how,
under what circumstances, or if at all, the state should provide sub-
stituted decision-making12 for this vulnerable population. The Re-
port begins with a brief description of relevant demographic trends
that illustrate the extent, and growing importance of the issue.
There is also a brief, but critical discussion about the changes in
language that have occurred since the enactment of 17-A, includ-
ing how those changes reflect and/or impact the ways in which
society perceives PWIDDS. The Report then describes two very dif-
ferent lenses, due process and human rights, through which recon-
sideration of 17-A might proceed, seeking to locate each in the
legal/historical contexts of the decades leading up to the initial
call for reconsideration in 1990, and the enormous changes in dis-
ability laws, disability rights, and the growth of human rights that
have occurred since the 1990s.
The shortcomings—or overkill—of existing 17-A are then ex-
amined through each of those lenses, noting also the legislature’s
relatively recent efforts to provide substituted decision making
outside of the guardianship context through its enactment of the
Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA).13 The Report neither
proposes, nor attempts to propose, a revised statute, but without
necessarily endorsing them, offers some suggestions for considera-
tion and some available models under each of the lenses that have
been previously identified.
11 A recent report by a cabinet created by Governor Cuomo to further the man-
date of Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) called for modernization of 17-A in
light of the Olmstead mandate. NEW YORK STATE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE OLMSTEAD CABINET: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SERVING NEW YORKERS IN THE
MOST INTEGRATED SETTING, 27-28 (Oct.2013), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/gov-
ernor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/documents/olmstead-cabinet-report101013.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/96YH-LAFV.
12 As discussed more fully, infra, 17-A and guardianship statutes generally involve
the state giving power to an individual or institution to make decisions for a PWIDD,
that is, substituting the guardian’s decision for that of the PWIDD and affording legal
recognition only to the former. While the standard to be utilized by the guardian may
differ, see, e.g., Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision Making Stan-
dards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491 (2014), it is clear that
the decision belongs solely to the guardian.
13 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994 et seq.
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II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
A. Demographics
There are an estimated 4.7 million individuals in the United
States with developmental disabilities.14 According to the American
Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
(“AAIDD”), “[d]evelopmental [d]isabilities is an umbrella term
that includes intellectual disability but also includes other disabili-
ties that are apparent during childhood.”15 Developmental disabili-
ties are a group of conditions that result from an impairment in
physical, learning, language, or behavior.16 The conditions gener-
ally begin during the developmental period, before the age of
twenty-two, and may impact day-to-day functioning, and usually last
throughout a person’s lifetime.17
Intellectual disability encompasses the cognitive aspect of a de-
velopmental disability, generally affecting thought processes.18 The
elements of intellectual disability include “(1) significant impair-
ments in intellectual functioning, as measured by IQ testing; (2)
deficits in real-world skills and abilities resulting from the disability
(adaptive behavior deficits); and, in the case of developmental dis-
ability (3) onset of the disability before the individual became an
adult.”19
Recent studies indicate a steady increase in the number of
children diagnosed with a developmental disability in the United
States. In a 2008 study spanning the course of twelve years, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Health
Resources and Services Administration surveyed children aged be-
tween three and seventeen years who had a current or prior diag-
14 See Rising Expectations, supra note 5.
15 Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-
on-intellectual-disability#.VPxCklvfeaI (last visited Mar. 8, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/96QV-WWEN.
16 Facts About Developmental Disabilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/developmentaldisabilities/facts.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R537-2XA3.
17 Id.
18 Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability, supra note 15. Intellectual disa-
bility also refers to persons with psychosocial disability (mental illness) and progres-
sive cognitive decline, such as Alzheimer’s disease, or dementia. Those persons are
not, however, covered by 17-A.
19 Brief for the Am. Assoc. on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities & the Arc
of the U.S. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet’r, at 8, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014) (No. 12-10882), available at http://aaidd.org/docs/default-source/policy/
freddie-lee-hall-v-state-of-florida .pdf?sfvrsn=0.
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nosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; intellectual
disability; cerebral palsy; autism; seizures; stuttering or stammering;
moderate to profound hearing loss; blindness; learning disorders;
and/or other developmental delays.20 The data indicated that be-
tween 1997 and 2008, there was an alarming 17.1% increase of par-
ent-reported developmental disabilities, with about one in six
children in the United States diagnosed with a developmental disa-
bility.21 The study noted that “low-income and public health insur-
ance were associated with a higher prevalence of many
disabilities.”22
Autism is the fastest growing developmental disability in the
United States.23 Based on the most recent statistics released by the
CDC, the number of children diagnosed with an autism spectrum
disorder24 has increased dramatically. In the year 2010, one in fifty
children eight years old were diagnosed with autism, compared to
one in sixty-eight children of the same age in the year 2000,25 a
30% increase from ten years ago.
The number of children with cerebral palsy, a developmental
disability caused by damage to the brain “usually occurring during
fetal development; before, during or shortly after birth; during in-
fancy; or during early childhood,” is also staggering.26 According to
the CDC, one in every 323 (or 3.3 per 1,000) children in the
United States has been identified with cerebral palsy, with almost
20 Key Findings: Trends in the Prevalence of Developmental Disabilities in Children 1997-




22 Boyle et al., Trends in the Prevalence of Developmental Disabilities in US Children,
1997-2008, 127 PEDIATRICS 6, 1035-42 (2008), available at http://pediatrics.aappublica
tions.org/content/early/2011/05/19/peds.2010-2989.abstract (abstract).
23 Facts and Statistics, AUTISM SOC’Y, http://autism-society.org/about-autism/facts-
and-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/42DH-LYHF.
24 Autism Spectrum Disorder is defined as “a lifelong developmental disability . . .
that include deficits in social communication and social interaction and restricted,
repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities.” Prevalence of Autism Spectrum
Disorder Among Children Aged 8 Years—Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring
Network, 11 Sites, United States, 2010 Surveillance Summaries, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
ss6302a1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/S7WH-NW57 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
25 Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www
.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/CX8E-NA5F.
26 Cerebral Palsy Fact Sheet, UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY, available at http://ucp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/cp-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/SL6T-3BA5.
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7% having a co-occurring autism spectrum disorder.27 Cerebral
palsy affects body movement, posture, and muscle coordination.
Down Syndrome, formerly referred to as mental retardation,28
occurs when an individual has a full or partial extra copy of chro-
mosome twenty-one. One in every 691 babies in the United States
is born with Down Syndrome. There are currently more than
400,000 people living with Down Syndrome in the United States,
and they are living considerably longer—into their 60’s and 70’s—
than when 17-A was passed (a life expectancy of less than twenty-
five). This addition in life expectancy has, unfortunately, also led
to increased risk of early onset Alzheimer’s.29
It is not just persons with Down Syndrome who are now ex-
pected to live longer. The total number of PWIDDS aged sixty and
older is projected to nearly double from 641,860 in 2000 to 1.2
million in 2030.30 All these demographics, but particularly those
relating to aging, have significant consequences for 17-A, which
was premised on the assumption that parents would almost cer-
tainly outlive their children with intellectual disabilities. That is no
longer the case.31
B. Changing Views and Resource
History reflects that a diagnosis of a developmental and/or in-
tellectual disability was once considered an insurmountable deficit
to achieving independence and self-determination. As the National
Institutes for Health has noted:
27 It is important to note that the CDC’s estimate comes from the Autism and
Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network, which tracks the number
and characteristics of 8 year old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and
other developmental disabilities in diverse communities throughout the U.S. In 2008,
there were 14 ADDM Network sites tracking ASD, and four of those sites also tracked
CP. These four sites, which include areas in Alabama, Georgia, Missouri and
Wisconsin.
28 The leading advocacy organization for people with Down Syndrome notes that
while “mental retardation” may still be clinically acceptable, the term “person with an
intellectual disability” is preferable. Preferred Language Guide, NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME
SOC’Y, http://www.ndss.org/Down-Syndrome/Down-Syndrome-Facts (last visited Apr.
19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7GQZ-79YU.
29 Id.
30 Carolyn C. Tingling, Adults With Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: A
Unique Population, 6 TODAY’S GERIATRIC MED. 3, 22 (2013), http://www.todaysgeria-
tricmedicine.com/archive/050613p22.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/74UZ-
57QB (citing Tamar Heller, People With Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Growing
Old: An Overview, 23 IMPACT 1, 2 (2010), available at https://ici.umn.edu/products/
impact/231/231.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8HNR-EE7C).
31 Anecdotally, many 17-A petitions are now brought by siblings or family friends
when parents have died or become too frail to serve as guardians.
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Historically, people with intellectual disabilities did not live as
long as others and were at increased risk for health problems.
Children often died because their condition could not be diag-
nosed. It was common for people with intellectual disabilities to
be institutionalized, and treatments were either non-existent, in-
effective, or harmful.32
Through medical advances and policy initiatives designed to
increase the independence, autonomy and self-determination of
PWIDDS, intellectual and developmental disability is no longer a
static diagnosis. Treatments and training techniques, for example,
which focus on communication and behavior have proven effective
in increasing the mental capacity of people with an intellectual
disability.33
Studies show that, if taught, self-determination, (e.g., decision
making, problem solving, goal setting and attainment, self-advo-
cacy, self-regulation, perceptions of efficacy, self-awareness, self-
knowledge) can be learned in order to permit an individual with a
disability to develop skills that promote independent decision-mak-
ing.34 Research has also shown that individuals with intellectual
and developmental disabilities who maintain a self-determination
status have more positive post-secondary outcomes, including em-
ployment, independent living and community inclusion.35 And
“students with disabilities given access to transition services focused
on self-determination and independent living skills are more likely
to live independently, be employed and exercise effective choice
and decision-making,” removing the undue burden of guardian-
ship.36 Further, the advent of Assistive Technology Resources,
32 Fact Sheet—Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (last up-
dated Oct. 2010), http://report.nih.gov/nihfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=100,
archived at http://perma.cc/LV7R-D2YH.
33 Id.
34 Susan B. Palmer & Michael L. Wehmeyer, A Teacher’s Guide to Implementing the
Self-Determined Learning Model of Instruction Early Elementary Version, BEACH CTR. ON DISA-
BILITY (2002), available at http://www.beachcenter.org/resource_library/beach_re
source_detail_page.aspx?%20Type=book&intResourceID=2599&JScript=1, archived at
http://perma.cc/EZT5-B7A3; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 26.
35 Self-Determination and People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: What
Does the Research Tell Us?, NAT’L GATEWAY TO SELF-DETERMINATION, http://www.aucd
.org/docs/SD-WhatDoWeKnow.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2015), archived at http://per
ma.cc/B92W-2HRJ.
36 Jonathan G. Martinis, One Person, Many Choices: Using Special Education Transition
Service to Increase Self-Direction and Decision-Making and Decrease Overbroad or Undue
Guardianship, THE JENNY HATCH JUSTICE PROJECT, 13, available at http://jennyhatchjus-
ticeproject.org/docs/publications/jhjp_publications_draft_article_guardianship.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (working paper), archived at http://perma.cc/ZU3Y-
ZWTV.
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which are devices and services (e.g. speech-recognition and word
prediction programs, alternative keyboards and talking calculators)
that advance learning and increase functionality, are being used to
lessen or remove barriers faced by PWIDDS.37
The diagnosis-driven regime of Article 17-A is out of step with
the social, legal and medical advances that have evolved over the
last forty years. Despite this social and cultural shift, Article 17-A
has failed to recognize the ability of individuals with intellectual
and developmental disabilities to live full, independent lives.
C. Language
The language utilized to name and define persons with a large
variety of intellectual disabilities has changed—if not necessarily
evolved—over centuries, with movement toward “respectful lan-
guage” promoted by disability rights activists, only within the past
two decades. Early English guardianship law divided PWIDDS into
two classes: the “idiot,” who had never had mental capacity, and the
“lunatic,” “a person who hath had understanding but hath lost the
use of his reason.”38 Our own laws followed a progression from
“feeble-minded” to “mentally deficient,” and then in the 1960’s, to
“mentally retarded”39 (the latter now frozen in time in 17-A).
The stigmatizing, derogatory, and hurtful uses of “retarded”
and “retards” are too well known to be repeated here.40 Advocates
for PWIDDS and self-advocates successfully lobbied states and,
eventually the federal government, to abandon the term, and in
October, 2010 President Obama signed “Rosa’s Law.”41 With its
37 How Does Rehabilitative & Assistive Technology Benefit People With Disabilities?, NAT’L
INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV., http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/
rehabtech/conditioninfo/pages/help.aspx (last updated Nov. 30, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/F4LF-3ALX.
38 A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional Crisis With Procedural
Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication, 7 ELDER L.J. 33, 48-49 (1999);
AM. BAR. ASS’N, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S.
Rock, eds., 1971). This distinction was noted by the Supreme Court in Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1993).
39 See, e.g., ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, 46-47 (1980).
40 Sadly, however, they have returned to our attention in the current concerns and
debates around bullying.
41 Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of. 20, 29, 42 U.S.C.). Rosa’s Law is named after a Maryland girl with
Down Syndrome, whose elementary school recoded her education from stating she
was “health impaired” to “mentally retarded.” Her family was successful in having the
school change the terminology, and later successful in advocating for the change of
terminology in Maryland’s Health and Education Code. See Susan Donaldson James,
Rosa’s Law to End Term “Mentally Retarded,” ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2009), http://
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passage, federal health, education and labor laws must no longer
use the term “mental retardation,” rather substituting “intellectual
disability.”42
To some, dwelling on semantics might seem academic, and, of
course, superficial changes without corresponding progress would
be pointless. In fact, however, the movement to change terminol-
ogy reflects a significant change in the evolving understanding of
intellectual disability and what it means in, and to, the medical,
advocacy and legal communities, as well as to families, support
providers, and policy makers.
While “intellectual disability” is now the term of choice, it is
also important to note the shift from the use of all these terms to
modify the subject “person” or “child” (as in “mentally retarded
child”) to a primary emphasis on the person, with the condition,
intellectual disability, now seen as a characteristic of her/him, but
not what defines her/him. Hence the move to a “person with (intel-
lectual or other) disability,” underscoring her or his position as a
legal subject.43 The importance of language, the centrality of the
person, and the harmful and stigmatizing effect of the term
“mental retardation” are echoed in New York State’s “historic” de-
cision in 2010 to change the name of the agency responsible for
coordinating services for PWIDDS from the Office of Mental Retar-
dation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) to the Office for
People With Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD).44
III. EVOLVING MODELS OF DISABILITY AND THE TWO LENSES
As often noted in the literature, just as the language of intel-
lectual disability has changed, so too, and perhaps partly because
of that change, “models,” or general understandings of disability
have also evolved. From the status model of 15th century England
(the “idiot,” the “lunatic”) to a medical model of the late of the late
19th and early 20th centuries, in which disability was a condition to
be treated and cured (and, for those who could not be cured, pit-
ied), the civil rights movements of the 60’s and 70’s, embraced by
an emerging disability rights movement, changed the model once
abcnews.go.com/Health/rosas-law-asks-senate-kill-slur-mentally-retarded/story?id=91
09319.
42 Rosa’s Law, supra note 41.
43 This change, growing from an equality model of human rights, as discussed in,
e.g., Arlene S. Kanter, What’s Disabilities Studies Got to Do With It or An Introduction to
Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 434 (2011).
44 See Agency Overview, OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEV. DISABILITIES, www.opwdd.ny
.gov/opwdd_about/overview_of_agency (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
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again, to a social model. As Syracuse Law Professor Arlene Kanter
writes, that model “places the responsibility squarely on society
(and not on the individual with a disability) to remove the physical
and attitudinal barriers that ‘disable’ people with various impair-
ments and prevent them from exercising their rights and fully inte-
grating into society.”45 Also referred to as the “socio-political”
model, the “problem” of disability is understood as external to the
PWIDD, that is, “in stereotypical attitudes and an environment that
fails to meet their needs, rather than within [PWIDDS] them-
selves.”46 This social model of disability was conclusively enshrined
in U.S. law with the passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(“the ADA”), whose twenty-fifth anniversary we  celebrate this
year.47
A. The Social Model and a Due Process Lens
Rejection of the prior medical model of disability was implic-
itly reflected in the movement to reform adult guardianship laws
that began in the late 1980’s; Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law
(“Art. 81”), a product of that movement, specifically eschews a di-
agnosis-driven definition of incapacity, focusing instead on a func-
tional analysis of the ways in which what is now denominated “the
allegedly incapacitated person” (AIP) is unable to protect him/
herself from harm with regard to specific domains. That is, it is no
longer enough to allege—or prove—that an AIP “suffers from” a
named disability like dementia or Alzheimer’s in order to appoint
a guardian or substituted decision maker.48
The move to a social, or socio-political model was very much a
product of a variety of forces within and without the disability
movement.49 It was not, however, the end of reconceptualizing dis-
45 Kanter, supra note 43, at 422.
46 Nicholas A. Dorsey, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and
Need for Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 446 (2009).
47 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. As a leading
commentator has noted:
The enactment of the [ADA] was viewed as a watershed in the disability
community, not only because of the substantive rights it guaranteed . . .
but also because it reflected a departure from the medical model and
an adoption of the movement’s socio-political model of disability.
Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2004)
(citations omitted).
48 See, e.g., ]Bailly, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y., Book
34A, N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.02.
49 These included the rise of self-advocacy and the legacy of various civil rights
movements. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal
Capacity, Guardianship and Beyond, 44 COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 107-11, 123-31
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 12 22-OCT-15 12:37
298 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:287
ability and, by extension, disability rights. The rise of international
human rights, the specific inclusion of disability in the discussion
of human rights, and the imperative of equality, dignity and inclu-
sion for all persons, regardless of disability, including intellectual
disability, began in the 1990’s50 and reached its culmination with
the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons With Disabilities (CRPD) in 2008.51
B. The Human Rights Model and Lens
The concept of human rights arose out of the horrors of
World War II with the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
in 1948.52 The fundamental principles of human rights law, as
enunciated by the UDHR, are “the equal and unalienable rights of
all members of the human family” and “every person’s inherent
dignity.”53 Unlike the “negative rights” conferred by the U.S. Con-
stitution (freedom from government interference with, e.g.,
speech, association, etc.) or by statutes such as the ADA, human
rights exist solely by virtue of the fact that one is born human. As
such, they are inalienable, indivisible, intra-dependent and inter-
related; that is, each depends on the others, and none can be taken
away by any law or any government.
Insofar as intellectual disability and guardianship are at issue,
the critical human right is that of legal capacity, first recognized in
Article 6 of the UHDR (“Everyone has a right to recognition, every-
(2012) (“Changing Paradigms”). For a fuller, and extremely rich account of the social
movements and changes that fueled this first revolution in disability rights, see AL-
LISON C. CAREY, ON THE MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2009).
50 See Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Law, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. &
COM. 241 (2003).
51 The United Nations General Assembly resolution 61/106 for the Convention on
the Rights of Persons With Disabilities (Dec. 13, 2006) entered into force with ratifica-
tion by 20 Member States in 2008. Entry into Force, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, http://
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=210 (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/K39L-NPKE. As of September 2014, the CRPD has been ratified by
150 Member States including all members of the European Union and the E.U. itself.
Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?id=166 (last visited Apr. 20, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/9WZV-2QE6.
52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). For a general discussion of this evolutionary process, see
Robert S. Drinan, S.J., The Mobilization of Shame: A World View of Human Rights, 3-12
(2001).
53 Id.
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where, as a person before the law”)54 and further explicated in Ar-
ticle 12 of the CRPD,55 which additionally provides that
(2) States parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities
enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all as-
pects of life [and that]
(3) States parties shall take appropriate measures to provide ac-
cess by persons with disabilities to the support they may re-
quire in exercising their legal capacity.56
Debate that preceded adoption of the CRPD clarified that legal
capacity involves not only all persons’ capacity to have, or bear
rights, but also to have the exercise of those rights legally recog-
nized.57 On its face, the CRPD would appear to prohibit substi-
tuted decision making of any kind. In its First General Comment,
the body charged with interpreting and enforcing the CRPD, the
Committee on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, has clearly
stated that guardianship as it currently exists is in violation of the
Convention while recognizing, as well, that Article 12 and the right
to legal capacity also necessarily includes freedom from abuse and
exploitation.58
Rethinking 17-A may thus be grounded in the due process
framework prevalent when the legislature first called for re-exami-
nation, a framework reflected in the multiple procedural protec-
tion included in the coterminous enactment of Art. 81.
Alternatively, it may take into account the “paradigm shift” in un-
derstanding the rights of PWIDDS through a human right lens that
has arisen since then with the globalization of disability rights and
54 Id. at 207.
55 It is important to note that the CRPD does not create any new human rights;
legal capacity is enshrined in the UDHR, which the U.S. has ratified. The CRPD
merely expounds the specific obligations of member states for implementation of that
right. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, The Perils of Guardianship and the Promise of Supported
Decision-Making, 48 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 17 (2014) (“Perils of Guardianships”).
56 CRPD, supra note 51, Art. 12. The CRPD Preamble also states this essential prin-
ciple that States parties:
Recogniz[e] the importance for persons with disabilities of their indi-
vidual autonomy and independence including the freedom to make
their own choices . . .”
Id. at Preamble.
57 See, e.g., Anita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Strangle-
hold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 429 (2007).
58 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Eleventh Session General
Comment, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, at No. 1 ¶¶21-23
(April 11, 2014), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/
031/20/PDF/G1403120.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/J732-Q586.
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the enactment of the CRPD.59 First, however, the obvious short-
comings of the existing statute, and the case law that it has engen-
dered, must be examined.
C. Utilizing Art. 81 in a Due Process Critique of 17-A
What follows is a description of the obvious and uncontro-
verted deficiencies of 17-A; that description utilizes the more
nuanced approach of Article 81 to highlight those deficiencies. It is
not, however, intended to endorse the provisions of Article 81 as
an alternative for at least two reasons.
First, the population of persons employing 17-A, or, in the fu-
ture, seeking some statutory power over or protection for PWIDDS,
is quite different from petitioners under Article 81.60 The 17-A pro-
cedure is, admittedly, far simpler, and can be managed relatively
easily by pro se petitioners. Clerks in most Surrogate’s Courts have
been trained to, and do assist pro se petitioners, including a signifi-
cant group for whom English is not a first language. Many 17-A
petitioners are also poor, so the cost of a court evaluator, man-
dated by Article 81, becomes a serious issue. A statute that is exem-
plary on paper, but unusable by those for whom it is designed,
cannot be a desirable goal for any rethinking of 17-A.
Second, a statute exemplary on paper, as Art. 81 arguably is
under the due process lens, may look very different as it is applied
in practice. That is certainly the case as to many of the provisions of
Article 81 that are routinely ignored, including the availability of
less restrictive alternatives, the preference for tailored guardian-
ship, and the requirement of detailed periodic reporting and re-
view. It would be cynical in the extreme to change 17-A to look
more like Art. 81, without an honest assessment of whether such
change would actually protect the rights of PWIDDS, rather than
simply making society feel better about the process.61
59 Changing Paradigms, supra note 49.
60 A recent article by an investigative journalist suggests that Art. 81 may be uti-
lized for reasons other than the protection or care of an “incapacitated person,” not-
ing the use of guardianship by nursing homes as a bill collection technique. Nina
Bernstein, To Collect Debts, Seizing Control Over Patients, N.Y. TIMES, January 26, 2015, at
A1.
61 For example, any proposal to increase the protection of rights for persons for
whom guardianship is sought by requiring the assignment of counsel is, at best, disin-
genuous without a commitment to the additional financial and personnel resources
that would be required.
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IV. THE CURRENT LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP FOR PWIDDS
17-A was intended to provide a simple, speedy method to per-
mit parents of mentally retarded children62 to retain sole legal de-
cision making power when those children reached their majority,
and it more than accomplished that goal, albeit at great cost to the
rights of those young adults.63 The main features of 17-A are that:
• It is entirely diagnosis driven, relying on a finding, by certain
enumerated health care professionals, of mental retardation
(and, after 1989, certain enumerated developmental
disabilities);
• In most instances there is no hearing, the Surrogate makes a
determination based solely on the papers submitted by the pe-
titioner, and never sees or hears from the person for whom
guardianship is sought;
• The guardianship is plenary; that is, the person under guardi-
anship loses to right to make any and all decisions.
• The appointment of a guardian has no time limit and contin-
ues indefinitely;
• There is no requirement that a guardian of the person ever
report on her “ward’s”64 situation, and there is no review of
the necessity for continuation of guardianship by the court.
As this cursory description of the statute demonstrates, it is entirely
out of date with regard to procedural protections that are now
both statutorily and constitutionally required.65
62 Despite the earlier discussion of the importance of respectful language, because
the statute, and the legislative history, utilize the terms “mental retardation” and
“mentally retarded,” those terms are employed here as well.
63 For the intent of the statute, see, e.g., Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 3, at 817-
819 (“[T]he legislature was mindful of the desire of parents to ‘provide for a lifetime
guardianship’ because ‘the present law does not take into account the unique status
of a retardate in that the fact and degree of retardation and the need for guidance
and assistance are determinable at a very early age and remain so for life.” (footnote
omitted)).
64 For the same reason that language has evolved with regard to the disabilities
that persons may possess, and to an emphasis on the person rather than her/his disa-
bility, see Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 3, advocates argue against the term “ward” as
entirely defining a person for whom guardianship may have been ordered. Thus, the
use of the terms “person to whom guardianship is sought” or “person under guardian-
ship”. There is currently a legislative proposal in Texas to change that state’s statute
precisely in this way. Guardianship Reform and Supported Decision Making Group,
Changing the Term Ward to Person Under Guardianship, A Policy Paper in Bill Form (on file
with committees).
65 The apparent constitutional infirmities of 17-A have been noted by commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 3; Changing Paradigms, supra note 49, at
119-21; Jeffrey A. Cohen, Thomas A. Dickerson & Joanne Matthews Forbes, A Legal
Review of Autism, A Syndrome Rapidly Gaining Attention Within Our Society, 77 ALB. L. REV.
381 (2013) (“[P]rior to judicial interpretation, [17-A] lacked most, if not all the due
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A. Least Restrictive Means
Central to the substantive, as opposed to procedural due pro-
cess required for the deprivation of liberty caused by the imposi-
tion of guardianship, and resonating throughout the discussion of
17-A which follows, is the concept of least restrictive means. That is,
as one court has explained:
Beginning with O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct.
2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 [1975], substantive due process has been
understood to include a requirement that when the state inter-
feres with an individual’s liberty on the basis of its police power,
it must employ the least restrictive means available to achieve its
objective of protecting the individual and the community. New
York courts have embraced the principle of least restrictive alter-
natives (see, e.g., Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161,
165, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889, 305 N.E.2d 903 [1973]) (“To subject a
person to a greater deprivation of his personal liberty than nec-
essary to achieve the purpose for which he is being confined is,
it is clear, violative of due process”); Manhattan Psychiatric
Center v. Anonymous, 285 A.D.2d 189, 197-98, 728 N.Y.S.2d 37
(1st Dept. 2001).66
When passing non-criminal statutes that curtail liberty, the leg-
islature has taken account of the constitutional imperative of least
restrictive means.67 And, of course, that is precisely the rationale
behind Art. 81, where the Law Revision Commission described the
goal of the statute as “requiring a disposition that is the least re-
strictive form of intervention.”68
Taking Article 81 as a due process-based model of what the
legislature has understood as necessary before the deprivation of
liberty (and, in the case of guardianship of the property, of that
process protection of Art. 81.”) (citing In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc.3d 765 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 2010)) (note that the two lead authors are Associate Justices of the Appellate
Division, Second Department). It has also been noted in judicial decisions. See, e.g., In
re Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d 570 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2012); In re Chaim A.K., 26 Misc.3d
837 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 2009); In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc.3d 765 (2010).
66 Matter of Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d at 526; see also In re Andrea B., 94 Misc.2d 919,
925 (Fam. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 1978) (“[S]ubstantive due process requires adherence to the
principle of least restrictive alternative . . . .”).
67 See, e.g., MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.60(h)(4), (i)(2) (codifying “Kendra’s Law,”
which deals with assisted outpatient treatment).
68 Law Revision Commission Comments, 34 A. McKinney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y.
§ 81.03. The statutory language incorporates the least restrictive means imperative in
slightly different language, “The legislature recognized that the legal remedy of
guardianship should be the last resort for addressing a person’s need because it de-
prives the person of so much power and control over his or her life.” MENTAL HYG.
§ 81.01 (emphasis added).
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right as well), the specific deficiencies of 17-A in this respect are
apparent.
B. Basis for Appointing a Guardian
Following the general reform trend of the late 1980’s, Article
81 eschews a diagnosis-driven determination of “incapacity,” re-
quiring instead a functional determination.69 The New York Court
of Appeals has embraced the functional approach: “Recognizing
that the presence of a particular [medical or psychiatric] condition
does not necessarily preclude a person from functioning
effectively.”70
Utilizing this functional approach, and proceeding from the
presumption that all adults possess full capacity, guardianship can
only be imposed when:
1) the person is likely to suffer harm; and
2) the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or
property management; and
3) the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate
the nature and consequences of such inability, MHL
81.02(s)(b)(1)-(2).71
By contrast to the tri-partite requirement of likely harm, inability to
provide, and inability to understand and appreciate, 17-A provides:
When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a per-
son is a developmentally disabled person, the court is author-
ized to appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, if
the appointment of such guardian or guardians is in the best
interest of the developmentally disabled person.72
That is, amazingly for 2014, a person with a developmental disabil-
ity, no matter how high functioning, and in the absence of any
likelihood of danger or harm, may have all decision-making perma-
nently removed solely on the subjective determination of a surro-
gate that the appointment of a guardian is in the person’s “best
interest.” No citation is necessary to demonstrate that such a stan-
dard falls far short of any notion of constitutional liberty and/or
property rights and substantive due process.
69 “In reading its determination the Court shall give primary consideration to the
functional level and functional limitations of the person.” MENTAL HYG. § 81.02(c).
70 Law Revision Commission Notes to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §81.02 (McKinney
2012) (citing In re Grinker (Rose), 77 N.Y.2d 703 (1991), and Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d
485 (1986), reargument den., 68 N.Y.2d 808 (1986)).
71 This is the classic definition of cognitive incapacity that informs most existing
guardianship laws, often shortened to “understand and appreciate.”
72 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1750-(1).
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C. The Requirement of a Hearing
Given the liberty and/or property interests at stake, Art. 81
requires a hearing in all cases.73 By contrast, under 17-A, if the peti-
tion for guardianship is brought by the parents, or by another per-
son with the consent of the parents, the court may, in its discretion,
dispense with the hearing. Anecdotally, most 17-A guardians are
appointed without a hearing, and thus without the court, which is
charged with determining “best interest,” ever seeing the person
for whom guardianship is sought. While both statutes theoretically
provide for a jury trial,74 anecdotally, and for obvious reasons, such
trials are seldom demanded in Art. 81 guardianships, and are es-
sentially non-existent for guardianships under 17-A.
D. Presence at the Hearing
Art. 81 provides that the person for whom guardianship is
sought must presumptively be present at the hearing, even if that
requires the judge to travel to a place, outside the courthouse,
where the person resides, “so as to permit the court to obtain its
own impression of the person’s capacity.”75 Exceptions are limited
to situations in which the person is outside the state or, by clear
evidence, the person “is completely unable to participate” or “no
meaningful participation will result from the person’s present
. . . .”76
By contrast, presence may be dispensed with under 17-A
where, upon medical evidence, presence “is likely to result in physi-
cal harm” or the person is “medically incapable” of attendance, or,
73 “A determination that the appointment of a guardian is necessary for a person
alleged to be incapacitated shall be made only after a hearing.” MENTAL HYG.
§ 81.11(a). As the Third Department has held, the failure to hold a hearing makes it
impossible for an appellate court to determine whether the powers granted to either
the guardian of the person or guardian of the property are the least restrictive form of
intervention or, for that matter, whether there is clear and convincing evidence of
incapacity. See, e.g., In re Ruth T.T., 267 A.D.2d 553, 554 (3d Dep’t 1999); In re Lula
XX, 224 A.D.2d 742 (3d Dep’t), appeal dismissed, 88 N.Y.2d 842 (1996); In re Maher v.
Maher, 207 A.D.2d 133 (2d Dep’t 1994), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 703 (1995).
74 MENTAL HYG. § 81.11(f); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. §1754. Both also provide that
unless a jury trial is demanded, it is deemed waived.
75 MENTAL HYG. § 81.11(2).
76 Id. §§ 81.11(c)(1)-(2). The Law Revision Commentary to MENTAL HYG. § 81.11
stresses the importance of “having present at the hearing the person whose rights may
be affected by the proceeding,” and notes that “seeing the person” also allows the
court to draw a carefully crafted and nuanced order which takes into account the
person’s dignity, autonomy and abilities, because the judge has had opportunity to
learn more about the person as an individual rather than a case description in a
report.”
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under an indeterminate standard, big enough to drive a truck
through, there are “such other circumstances which the court finds
would not be in the best interests of the mentally retarded or devel-
opmentally disabled person.”77 And, of course, the person is not
present at a hearing in the vast majority of cases, because no hear-
ing is held.
E. Burden of Proof
In accordance with the importance of liberty issues implicated,
Art. 81 requires proof of clear and convincing evidence of each of
the three criteria—likely harm, inability to provide, and inability to
understand and appreciate—described above.78 There is no indica-
tion of the burden of proof in Art. 12, so, as a civil proceeding, the
burden is presumptively preponderance of the evidence.79
F. Right to Counsel
While Art. 81 grants the AIP “the right to choose and engage
legal counsel of the person’s choice,”80 it also requires appoint-
ment of counsel in a number of circumstances, including when the
AIP requests counsel, wishes to contest the proceeding, does not
consent to major medical or dental treatment, or to transfer to a
nursing home. As a matter of case law, where the AIP is indigent,
and important constitutionally protected interests are at stake, the
state, or its appropriate subdivision, is required to pay for assigned
counsel.81
There are no such provisions in, or case law, about 17-A ex-
cept that where the person for whom guardianship is sought re-
sides in a facility, as defined by MHL 47.01(a). Mental Health Legal
Services (“MHLS”) in the appellate division department must be
77 Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. §1754(3). Where there is a hearing, but the presence of the
person for whom guardianship is sought has been dispensed with, the court may (but
is not required to) appoint a guardian ad litem. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1754(4). There is
no provision for payment of anyone so appointed.
78 MHL § 81.12(a).
79 See In re Chaim A.K., 26 Misc.3d 837, 847 n.28 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2009) (citing
In re Jaime S., 9 Misc.3d 460 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 2005); In re Jonathan Alan Muel-
ler, 25 Misc.3d 165, 166 (Surr. Ct., Dutchess Cnty. 2009) (stating that it is unlikely that
Art. 81’s requirement of clear and convincing evidence applies. “[T]he decision to
appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, under N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act.
§ Art. 17-A is based upon a less stringent standard of proof, namely, the best interests
of the mentally or developmentally disabled person.”).
80 MENTAL HYG. § 81.10(a).
81 See In re St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hospital Ctr. (Marie H.), 226 A.D.2d 106 (1st Dep’t
1996), aff’d, 89 N.Y.2d 889 (1996).
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served with the petition.82As a matter of practice, MHLS generally
appears when a hearing is held, or files a report when a hearing is
dispensed with.
G. Right to Cross Examine
Art. 81 specifically provides a person opposing guardianship
with the hallowed right to cross examine.83 Not only is there no
comparable provision in 17-A, but the use of form affidavits for the
medical “proof” necessary to impose guardianship means that the
critical element of the need for 17-A guardianship—the medical
diagnosis of mental retardation or developmental disability84—is
routinely met by pure, and purely inadmissible, hearsay.  The
healthcare professionals need only check a box, on a form, that the
person “suffers from” mental retardation or developmental disabil-
ity; a box that such disability began prior to the persons reaching
twenty one; a box that by virtue of her or his disability, the person
is unable to manage her or his affairs; and a box that such disability
is likely to continue indefinitely.
H. Medical Privacy and the Doctor-Patient Privilege
There is another major issue related to the use of affidavits in
17-A proceedings, and the records, however incomplete, that are
frequently appended to them. Such submissions clearly violate the
privacy rights,85 and the physician/patient privilege,86 of the per-
son for whom guardianship is sought as well as her/his statutory
82 Surr. Ct. Proc. Act §1753(2)(b).
83 MENTAL HYG. § 81.11(b)(3). The Supreme Court has continuously emphasized
the centrality of this right to due process. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (reviewing the history of the confrontation clause and concluding its pur-
pose was directed at keeping ex parte examinations out of the record); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (holding that one of the minimum requirements of
due process includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses).
84 Two health care professionals, one of whom must be an M.D., must certify that
the person for whom guardianship is sought suffers from either mental retardation,
or developmental disability, that the condition is likely to continue indefinitely, and
that s/he cannot manage her personal affairs and/or property. See N.Y. Surr. Ct. Pro-
cedure Act Law §1750-a (McKinney 2005), Affidavit (Certification) of Examining Phy-
sician or Licensed Psychologist (GMD-2a), and Affirmation (Certification) of
Examining Physician (GMD-2B) as included in the Petition for Appointment of
Guardian, available at www.nycourts.gov/forms/surrogates/omni/gd17A.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/HEX2-MKFU.
85 See Joseph Rosenberg, Routine Violations of Medical Privacy in Article 81 Guardian-
ship Cases: So What or Now What?, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Jan. 2013, at 34.
86 The physician/patient privilege is codified in C.P.L.R. § 4504. Additionally,
MHL Section 33.13(c) provides that records maintained by a mental health facility
may be disclosed only with a patient’s consent or by court order.
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rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”).87 HIPAA requires health care providers to main-
tain the confidentiality of information about a patient unless the
patient gives consent or a court orders the production of such in-
formation; neither of these circumstances routinely—if ever—oc-
cur in 17-A proceedings.
One Surrogate’s Court has recognized this issue in a contested
proceeding where the person for whom guardianship was sought
made an equal protection claim. Relying on an appellate decision
that disallowed testimony by a former physician in an Art. 81 pro-
ceeding without the consent of the AIP as violative of CPLR 4504,88
the Surrogate held that there was no rational basis for treating the
subjects of Art. 81 and 17-A proceedings differently. The court
went on to hold that when the subject of a guardianship proceed-
ing does not waive the privilege, or affirmatively put his or her
medical condition into controversy, testimony about her/his medi-
cal treatment is inadmissible.89 The same, presumably, would be
true for medical records.
I. Findings
In order to appoint a guardian of the person and/or property
under Art. 81, the court must make specific findings on the re-
cord.90 Even where the AIP agrees to appointment, the court must
find (in addition to the agreement) the person’s functional limita-
tions; necessity for a guardian to deal with those limitations; the
specific powers granted to the guardian; and the duration of the
appointment.91
Where there is no consent, additional findings are required,
demonstrating that petitioner has met its burden, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the AIP lacks understanding and apprecia-
tion of the nature and consequences of her or his functional
limitations; the likelihood of harm resulting from the lack of un-
derstanding and appreciation; not only the specific powers granted
to the guardian, but that they are the least restrictive form of inter-
vention necessary;92 and whether the A.I.P.,93 now denominated
87 45 C.F.R. §§160.103, 164.508, 164.512(e) (2006).
88 In re Rosa B.S, 1 A.D.3d 355 (2d Dep’t 2003).
89 In re Derek, 12 Misc.3d 1132 (Surr. Ct. Broome Cnty. 2006).
90 MENTAL HYG. § 81.15.
91 Id. §§ 81.15(a)(2-5).
92 Id. §§ 81.15(b)(2-3), (5).
93 Like the term “ward,” the language employed by Art. 81 after the imposition of
guardianship, “Incapacitated Person,” or “I.P.” unfortunately and inappropriately en-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 22 22-OCT-15 12:37
308 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:287
the I.P.94 should receive copies of the initial and annual report.
Where a guardian of the property is appointed, the court must also
make findings as to the type and amount of property involved and
“any additional findings that are required under Section 81.21.”95
The purpose of record findings in Art. 81 as in other proceed-
ings where the legislature has also required findings96 is to ensure
that the court has fully complied with the statutory requirement of
proof, as well as to provide a record for appeal. There is no re-
quirement for findings after a hearing under 17-A and, of course,
where there is no hearing, there can be no record findings.
J. Eligibility and Qualification of Guardian
Article 81 provides detailed considerations for who should be
appointed a guardian, including consideration of the AIP’s prefer-
ences and/or nomination.97 The court is required to consider, inter
alia, the social relationship between the proposed guardian and
the AIP, and between the proposed guardian and “other persons
concerned with the welfare of the incapacitated person;”98 the care
and services being provided to the incapacitated person;99 the
unique requirements of the incapacitated person;100 and whether
there are any conflicts of interest between the proposed guardian
and the incapacitated person.101
tirely defines the person by virtue of her/his disability; while I.P. is used here in its
statutory context, “person under guardianship” is the preferred term.
94 Given that a person for whom a guardian is appointed under Art. 81 has the
right to move to terminate the guardianship, MENTAL HYG. §§ 81.36(a) and (b), it is
difficult to understand—or to justify—why she or he should not be entitled to copies
of the report that allegedly contain information as to why the guardianship should
continue.
95 MENTAL HYG. § 81.15(c)(1).
96 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(g) (stating that in equitable distribu-
tion of marital properly, court must consider fourteen enumerated factors and, in its
decision “shall set forth the factors” consider that were not waived by counsel).




101 MHL 81.19(d)(8). Unfortunately, the reality of ensuring appropriate qualifica-
tions for guardians under Art. 81 has fallen far short of what is necessary to protect
those who are placed under their power and control. A 2010 study by the federal
Government Accountability Office found that in New York, among other states, per-
sons who applied for certification as guardians using false identification with the
name of a deceased person, or with a bad credit record, were routinely certified. U.S.
Govt. Accountability Office, GAO-1046, Guardianships: Cases of Financial Exploitation,
Neglect, and Abuse of Seniors (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
10-1046 (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3P7R-3DGY. The
practice in appointing 17-A guardians appears more thorough in some respects, as
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Presumably because 17-A was enacted to allow parents to con-
tinue exercising control over children with mental retardation who
attained their majority, and because it was presumed that parents
were the “natural” caretakers who inevitably had their children’s
best interests at heart, there are no provisions whatever in 17-A as
to considerations to be taken into account by the court if a guard-
ian is to be appointed.102
K. Powers of the Guardian: Plenary or Limited
One of the most significant differences between the protec-
tion of Art. 81 and 17-A, and perhaps the most glaring constitu-
tional failure of the latter, is that, upon the diagnosis and “best
interest” finding, the Surrogate’s only choice, without regard to
“least restrictive alternative,”103 is imposition of a plenary guardian,
and thus removal of all decision making power from the person on
whom guardianship is imposed.
As the legislative findings clearly state,104 Art. 81 demonstrates
both prospective guardians and standby guardians must be fingerprinted, with their
prints sent to the statewide criminal registry for review.
102 One court has read into the statute a preference for relatives, and in particular,
for a parent, finding a “presumption that ‘parents prevail in a contest with a non-
parent’ that can be overcome only where the non-parent establishes ‘extraordinary,
circumstances.’” In re Timothy R.R., 42 Misc.3d 775 (Sur. Ct. Essex Cnty. 2013) (rely-
ing on, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976), and citing an unreported case,
In re Boni P.G., 13 Misc.3d 1235[A] (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2006)).
103 One court, considering 17-A, has noted that “least restrictive means” is a consti-
tutional imperative, as well as a statutory requirement under Art. 81. In re Dameris L.,
38 Misc.3d at 526.
104 “Legislative findings and purpose. The legislature hereby finds that the needs of
persons with incapacities are as diverse and complex as they are unique to the individ-
ual. The current system of conservatorship and committee does not provide the nec-
essary flexibility to meet these needs. Conservatorship, which traditionally
compromises a person’s rights only with respect to property frequently, is insufficient
to provide necessary relief. On the other hand, a committee, with its judicial finding
of incompetence and the accompanying stigma and loss of civil rights, traditionally
involves a deprivation that is often excessive and unnecessary. Moreover, certain per-
sons require some form of assistance in meeting their personal and property manage-
ment needs but do not require either of these drastic remedies. The legislature finds
that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons with incapacities to make available to
them the least restrictive form of intervention, which assists them in meeting their
needs but, at the same time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-
determination of which they are capable. The legislature declares that it is the pur-
pose of this act to promote the public welfare by establishing a guardianship system
which is appropriate to satisfy either personal or property management needs of an
incapacitated person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person,
which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person,
and which affords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-determi-
nation and participation in all the decisions affecting such person’s life.” MENTAL
HYG. § 81.01.
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a strong, if not overwhelming preference against plenary guardian-
ship, in favor of guardianship that is closely tailored to meet the
specific functional impairments that might result in harm to the
I.P. The statute specifically provides that if the court has found the
AIP incapacitated and that appointment of guardian is necessary:
“The order of the court shall be designed to accomplish the least
restrictive form of intervention by appointing a guardian with pow-
ers limited to those which the court has found necessary to assist
the incapacitated person in providing for personal needs and/or
property management.”105
Subsequent sections detail in illustrative, but not exhaustive
examples, the powers which may be conferred on guardians of the
person and the property.106 Art. 81 also provides for protective, or
single purpose transactions (“one shots”) as an even less restrictive
means than appointing a full guardian.107 And, reiterating the least
restrictive means mandate, Art. 81 imposes an obligation on every
guardian to “[a]fford the incapacitated person the greatest amount
of independence and self determination with respect to [personal
needs and/or property management]—in light of—that person’s
wishes, preferences and desires . . . .”108 By contrast, 17-A simply
provides that “[i]f the court is satisfied that the best interests of the
mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person will be pro-
moted by the appointment of a guardian of the person, or the
property, or both, it shall make a decree naming such person or persons
as guardians.”109 That is, there is not only no preference for a lim-
105 Id. § 81.16(c)(2).
106 Id. § 81.21-22.
107 Id. § 81.16. As the Law Revision commentary notes with respect to 81.16, “[t]he
list of alternatives available to the court emphasizes the statute’s underlying goal of
promoting the least restrictive alternative. The most significant part of this section is
the provision governing protective arrangements and single transactions, a provision
based on section 5-40 of the Uniform Probate Code. With this section, Article 81 fills a
gap in New York’s law identified by the Court of Appeals in In re Grinker (Rose),
namely, that where a person may require assistance but does not require the
equivalent of either a conservator or a committee, or even where the equivalent of
either a conservator or a committee, or even where the equivalent of a conservator is
appropriate, appointment of the equivalent of “a conservator with its consequent af-
front to the integrity and independence of the individual . . . ought to be among the
last alternatives.” 77 N.Y.2d at 712. Proposed Article 81 allows the court to fashion
remedies which may include protective arrangements or single transactions which as-
sure security, service or care to meet the foreseeable needs of the incapacitated per-
son but do not deprive the person of independence and autonomy.” Law Revision
Commission Comments, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 34A, Mental Hygiene
Law § 81.16.
108 MENTAL HYG. §§ 81.20(6)(1), (7) (“Duties of Guardian”).
109 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1754(5) (emphasis added).
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ited or tailored guardian, there is no provision for anything but a
plenary guardian.110
There is one very limited exception to the plenary guardian-
ship imposed under 17-A. The statute provides for a “limited
guardian of the property” when the person for whom guardianship
is sought is 18 or over and “wholly or substantially self-supporting
by means of his or her wages or earnings from employment.”
Under these circumstances, the court may appoint a guardian for
all property of the person other than that received from wages or
earnings. In addition, despite the imposition of a property guard-
ian with the specified restriction, the person who is otherwise de-
nied the right to contract by virtue of the guardianship “shall have
the power to contract or legally bind himself or herself for such
sum of money not exceeding one month’s wages or earnings . . . or
three hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or as otherwise author-
ized by the court.”111
While it is difficult to understand why a PWID who is working
and supporting him or herself needs a guardian at all, calling the
entire enterprise into question, this is the sole instance of “tailor-
ing” permitted by 17-A.
Relying on this “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,” one Surro-
gate has held that 17-A does not permit tailoring such that guardi-
ans of the property may make gifts from that property,112 while
another Surrogate in New York County has read into 17-A author-
ity to tailor a guardianship where necessitated by best interests.113
This difference in approaches, without clarification from a higher
court, has led to confusion among practitioners,114 but, more sig-
110 Because 17-A is such a “blunt instrument,” as well as because of its constitutional
infirmities, one court has held that it must be strictly construed, such that where
proof indicated that the person for whom guardianship was sought had a primary
diagnosis of mental illness, rather than mental retardation or developmental disabil-
ity, only the more flexible, limited Art. 81 could be employed. In re Chaim A.K., 26
Misc.3d 837 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2009).
111 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1756.
112 See In re John J.H., 27 Misc.3d 705 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2010). The court also
relied in the general proposition that “when enacting a statute the Legislature is pre-
sumed to act with deliberation and with knowledge of the existing statutes on the
same subject.” In re Jonathan E.E, 86 A.D.3d 696, 698 (3d Dep’t 2011) (citing McKin-
ney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y., Book 1 Statute §222 at 384). Upon a finding that the relief
requested was not available in a 17-A proceeding, the petitioner parents withdrew
their petition in favor of commencing a new proceeding under Art. 81, under which
such relief is specifically authorized.
113 In re Yvette A., 27 Misc.3d 945 (Surr. Ct., N.Y.Cnty. 2010); see also In re Joyce SS,
30 Misc.3d 765 (Surr. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2010) (holding that Surrogate had the power to
invoke the doctrine of substituted judgment in authorizing gifting by a guardian).
114 Bailly & Nick-Torok, supra note 3, at 834.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 26 22-OCT-15 12:37
312 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:287
nificantly, spotlights the shortcomings of a statute that makes no
provision for the limitation of powers that is constitutionally re-
quired, or the tailoring necessary to delineate the powers of a
guardian if one is appointed.
It is also important to note that as a consequence of the re-
quirement of “tailoring,” Art. 81 specifically provides that a person
for whom a guardian is appointed “retains all powers and rights
except those powers and rights which the guardian is granted.”115
Such rights include constitutionally protected rights such as voting
and marriage. The wholesale grant of plenary power to a 17-A
guardian would appear to deprive the person under guardianship
of all rights, though there is surprisingly little case law
explication.116
There is also a strong caveat here. Although Art. 81 uses all the
right words, and includes all the appropriate provisions to ensure
the constitutional imperative of least restrictive intervention, the
reality on the ground is far different. There are no available statis-
tics on the number of guardianships sought or awarded,117 much
less on whether plenary or limited,118 but anecdotally, the vast ma-
jority of adult guardianships imposed are plenary; a 2007 national
survey found that in 90% of cases, persons found to be incapaci-
tated were deprived of all of their liberty and property rights.119
That is to say, while Art. 81 is useful as a comparison in demonstrat-
ing the shortcomings of 17-A, it is hardly a guarantee that the
rights of “incapacitated persons” are actually being protected.
L. Reporting and Review
Art. 81 includes detailed reporting requirements120 for guardi-
115 MHL 81.29(a).
116 One court has placed limitations on a 17-A guardian’s power where reproduc-
tive rights are involved, refusing to permit sterilization upon the guardian’s consent.
In re DD, 90 Misc.2d 236 (Tompkins County Ct. 2002).
117 Bernstein, supra note 60, ¶ 5.
118 This is a national problem: see Brenda K. Uekert & Richard Van Duizend, Adult
Guardianships: A “Best Guess” National Estimate and the Momentum for Reform, in Future
Trends in State Courts 107, 109 (2011).
119 Pamela B. Teaster, et al., Public Guardianship After 25 Years: In the Best Interest of
Incapacitated People?”, National Study of Public Guardianship, Phase II Report, 96
(2007).
120 For guardians of the person, the report must include information on the person
under guardianship’s residence, including whether the current residence is best
suited to the person’s needs; physical condition, including a health care provider’s
report made within three months, also detailing the current functional level of the
incapacitated person; any major changes in physical or mental condition, or in medi-
cations; an account of medical treatment over the preceding year and a plan for medi-
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ans of both the person and the property, including an initial re-
port, to be filed within ninety days of issuance of a commission to
the guardian;121 and, thereafter, annual reports, MHL 81.31, which
are reviewed by court examiners, appointed and supervised by the
Appellate Division for the Department in which the appointing
court is located.122 The purpose of the report is primarily to ensure
the well being of the person under guardianship and, where appro-
priate, the good stewardship of her/his property,123 but, signifi-
cantly, the report also must include any “facts indicating the need
to terminate the appointment of the guardian” or for any change
in powers.  That is, Art. 81 recognizes that conditions may change,
and/or functional capacity increase (or decrease), thus altering
the least restrictive intervention and requiring a “new look” by the
court.124
By contrast, although 17-A requires a yearly filing on finances
cal, dental and mental health treatment for the coming year; and “information
concerning the social condition of the incapacitated person including: the social and
personal services currently utilized . . ., the social skills . . . and the social needs of the
incapacitated person.” MHL § 81.36(6)(iv). For guardians of the property, “the infor-
mation required by [the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act] . . . for an annual account-
ing of a general guardian of an infant’s property.” MHL § 81.31(7). The initial report
also requires a complete inventory of the person’s property over which the guardian




123 Two leading commentators have summarized the reasons for periodic reporting
and review, also called “monitoring” as follows:
First, historically courts have had a parens patriae duty to protect those
unable to care for themselves. Parens patriae is the fundamental basis
for guardianship and the primary justification for curtailing civil rights.
The court appoints the guardian to carry out this duty and the guardian
is a fiduciary bound to the highest standards. ‘In reality,’ observed one
judge, ‘the court is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is
merely an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its sacred re-
sponsibility.’ Second, unlike with decedents’ estates, the incapacitated
person is a living being whose needs may change over time. This argues
for a more active court role in oversight. Third, monitoring can be good
for the guardian by offering guidance and support in the undertaking
of a daunting role. Fourth, monitoring can be good for the court by
providing a means of tracking guardianship cases and gauging the ef-
fect of court orders. Finally, monitoring can boost the court’s image and
inspire public confidence.
Sally Balch Hurme and Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and Now: Tracing
Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 Stetson L.Rev. 867, 871-872 (citations omitted)
(2002).
124 The importance of periodic reporting and review was noted in the “Wingspread
Recommendations” that led to guardianship reform in the late 1980’s and early
1990’s the Uniform Guardianship Procedure and Protection Act (UGPPA) and in the
National Probate Court Standards, In re Chaim A.K., 26 Misc.3d 837, n.18 and 19.
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by a guardian of the property,125 once a guardian of the person is
appointed s/he is never, ever again required to provide any informa-
tion about the well-being—or not—of the person under guardian-
ship, or whether there is any continuing reason for a guardian.126
The former raises serious concerns that abuse and/or neglect may
be occurring, unknown to the court which has vested total power
in the guardian. Surely substantive due process requires that when
the state intervenes to deprive someone of her/his liberty in the
guise of protection, that person should not be worse off because of
the intervention. This is what monitoring is intended to prevent; its
absence is a grave and almost certainly a constitutional failure.
The latter is equally serious, continuing a massive deprivation
of liberty when a person is capable of living—and thriving—with a
less restrictive form of intervention, or no intervention at all. With-
out periodic review there is no way for the court to know whether
the guardianship should be modified (assuming that such tailoring
were available under the statute) or terminated (see discussion in-
fra). In addition to the likely constitutional violation,127 the failure
to review, caused by absence of any periodic reporting, may well
also violate the “least restrictive setting” requirement of the Ameri-
can With Disabilities Act (ADA).128
M. Modification, Termination, & Restoration of Rights
However defined, a person’s “capacity” is seldom static; people
gain or lose functional capacity, or their circumstances change
such that greater or lesser functional capacity is required to permit
125 Unlike the Art. 81 reports, which are reviewed by paid outside court examiners,
the clerks in Surrogate’s Court are expected to perform this service for reports by
guardians of the property, including following up when reports are not timely filed.
The extent to which this occurs, and the care and/or expertise available is nowhere
assessed or reported.
126 The absence of any reporting requirement was undoubtedly premised on the
view that it was parents who would be guardians, and that parent always have the best
interests of their children at heart. Unfortunately, as the tragedies of child abuse
demonstrate, this is not always the case. But, equally important—and now mistaken—
was the view forty years ago that mental retardation and, subsequently, developmental
disabilities were permanent, unchanging conditions, with little or no likelihood of
improvement, much less “cure.”
127 One court has held that, in the absence of periodic reporting and review, 17-A is
unconstitutional; the Surrogate administratively imposed the requirement of yearly
reporting on all guardians of the person in that court. In Re Mark C.H., 28 Misc.3d 765
(2010).
128 See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581. For a thorough and provocative discussion of
the ADA in the context of PWIDDS and guardianship, see Leslie Saltzman, Rethinking
Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision-Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate
of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 157 (2010).
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them to live without substantial risk of harm. For persons who are
under Art. 81 guardianship because of a stroke or a traumatic
brain injury, symptoms can be alleviated through medical treat-
ment; functional abilities lost to disease or accident can be
regained (by the same token, of course, function and/or cognitive
abilities may progressively decline, as they do with Alzheimer’s Dis-
ease). When such changes occur, the imperative of least restrictive
intervention mandates concomitant changes in the powers granted
to a guardian, or, in some cases, termination of the guardianship
and the full restoration of all rights.
Article 81 recognizes this shifting continuum of functional ca-
pacity/incapacity and specifically provides for modification of a
guardian’s powers—whether an increase129 or decrease—or termi-
nation130 “where the incapacitated person has become able [or un-
able] to exercise some or all of the powers necessary to provide for
personal needs or property management which the guardian is au-
thorized [or not authorized] to exercise.”131 There is broad stand-
ing to initiate a proceeding for modification or termination.132 A
hearing is presumptively required,133 and a jury trial is available on
demand by the incapacitated person or her/his counsel.134 Where
the relief sought is termination, the burden of proof is on the party
opposing such relief—that is, it must be proven, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the grounds for guardianship continue to ex-
ist.135 These provisions embody and instrumentalize the principle
129 If the statute were strictly adhered to, for example, a person with early or mod-
erate Alzheimers might have a property guardian to manage investments, but still
retain a bank account and the power to engage in ordinary, day-to-day financial trans-
actions. If and when her cognitive abilities significantly declined, the guardian might
seek—and obtain—more extensive powers. In actual practice, partly out of concern
for the expense and disruption of repeated proceedings, courts tend not to tailor, or
limit powers, but rather to grant plenary guardianships, even when unjustified under
the statute, to avoid having petitioners return to court at a later date when expanded
powers might be required.
130 MENTAL HYG. LAW §  81.36
131 MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.36(a)(1)-(2).
132 “The application . . . may be made by the guardian, the incapacitated person, or
any person entitled to commence a proceeding under this article.” MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.36(b). There is a wide range of persons “entitled to commence proceedings.”
While Id. § 81.06(a)(1)-(6) does not explicitly include a close friend, domestic part-
ner, or other relative who is not a “presumptive distributee” under the Surrogate’s
Court Procedure Act, it includes “a person otherwise concerned with the welfare of
the person alleged to be incapacitated” which could presumably include any or all of
the above.
133 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.36(c).
134 Id.
135 Id. § 81.36(d). By the same token, where the petitioner seeks to increase the
powers of the guardian, the same evidentiary burden falls on her/him. Id.
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of least restrictive intervention.
Like those persons for whom guardianship is commonly
sought under Art. 81, PWIDDS also fall on a spectrum of capacity
requiring greater or lesser intervention or assistance,136 and, like
the subjects of Art. 81 guardianships, their conditions and life cir-
cumstances may change.137 For example, no longer is a diagnosis
of autism (or a condition on the autism spectrum) an indication of
a permanent, unchanging disability. Persons with autism may, with
various interventions, significantly improve their functioning138 or
even “recover” or be “cured,”139 and there is promising new re-
search on interventions for persons with Down Syndrome.140
Under 17-A, guardianship presumptively continues for the en-
tire life the person under guardianship.141 The statute provides for
modification “to protect the mentally retarded or developmentally
disabled person’s financial situation and/or his or her personal in-
terests.”142 Such modification, which does not require a hearing,143
is generally employed to replace one family member guardian with
another,144 or where a person for whom a guardian of the person
has been appointed comes into money, requiring the additional
powers of a guardian of the property.
While there is explicit statutory provision for termination,145
136 For example, mental retardation is determined by IQ scores, themselves subject
to “challenge, as illness, motor or sensory impairments, language barriers, or cultural
differences may hamper a child’s test performance.” The Merck Manual of Diagnosis
and Therapy, Mental Retardation, 18th ed. 2006.
137 A change in life circumstances, as in the development of a system of supported
decision-making (see discussion infra) may alter or negate the need for a guardian. See,
e.g., In re Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d 570 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2012); A recent article in the
American Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities reports research that
young adults with Down Syndrome have significantly higher “adaptive” skills than
their low I.Q. scores might suggest. James Edgin & Fabian Fernandez, The Truth About
Down Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/
opinion/the-truth-about-down-syndrome.html?_r=0.
138 Advances in treatment of autism may result in substantial and potentially legally
significant increases in functional capacity. See, e.g., Susan Kabot et al., Advances in the
Diagnosis and Treatment of Autism Spectrum Disorders, 34(1) PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC.
26 (2003).
139 See, e.g., Ruth Padawer, After Autism: The Recovered, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 3, 2014,
at 20.
140 See Edgin & Fernandez, supra note 137.
141 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1759 (“[G]uardianship shall not terminate at the age
of majority or marriage of [the] mentally retarded or developmentally disabled per-
son but shall continue during the life of such person, or until terminated by court.”).
142 Id. § 1755.
143 See In re Lemmer, 179 A.D.2d 926 (3d Dep’t 1992).
144 See, e.g., In re Garrett YY, 258 A.D.2d 702 (3d Dep’t 1999).
145 A person eighteen years or older for whom such a guardian has been
previously appointed or anyone, including the guardian, on behalf of a
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there is no indication as to the burden of proof, or, indeed, even
what must be proved for the guardianship to be “dissolved.” Anec-
dotally, applications for termination of guardianship brought by a
person under guardianship are extremely rare.146
N. Brief Detour: OPWDD Regulations and The Health Care Decisions
Act
One reason that parents or others might be motivated to seek
guardianship for a PWIDD is the fear that, in the absence of a
guardian, no one would be empowered to make major medical de-
cisions, including end of life decisions, for the person. This con-
cern may be slightly, if not entirely alleviated by two legal regimes
that permit surrogate decision-making for a PWIDD with respect to
major medical decisions, including end of life decisions.
With respect to major medical decisions that do NOT involve
the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining medical treatment,
individuals who are receiving services under the auspices of New
York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities
(“OPWDD”), fall within the OPWDD regulation contained in title
14, section 633.11 of the Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regula-
tions of the State of New York. Section 633.11 sets forth the proce-
dures for obtaining informed consent for “professional medical
treatment.”147 If a guardian has not been appointed, the following
individuals may provide consent for a minor:
(2) an actively involved spouse;148
(3) a parent;
mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person for whom a
guardian has been appointed may petition the court which made such
appointment or the court in his or her county of residence to have the
guardian discharged and a successor appointed, or to have the guardian
of the property designated as a limited guardian of the property, or to
have the guardianship order modified, dissolved or otherwise amended.
Upon such a petition, the court shall conduct a hearing pursuant to
section seventeen hundred fifty-four of this article.
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1759(2). The reference to N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act. § 1754
suggests that the determination might be made without a hearing, though no case law
has been found one way or the other.
146 In re Mark C.H., 28 Misc.3d 765, n.28 (2010).
147 The term “professional medical treatment” is defined as follows: “A medical,
dental, surgical or diagnostic intervention or procedure in which a general anesthetic
is used or which involves a significant invasion of bodily integrity requiring an incision
or producing substantial pain, discomfort, debilitation or having a significant recov-
ery period, or any professional diagnosis or treatment to which informed consent is
required by law.” 14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 633.99(da) (2015).
148 “Actively involved” is defined as: “Significant and ongoing involvement in a per-
son’s life so as to have sufficient knowledge of the person’s needs.” Id. § 633.99(ax).
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(4) an actively involved adult sibling;
(5) an actively involved adult family member;149
(6) a local commissioner of social services with custody over
the person pursuant to the social services law or family court
act (if applicable); or
(7) a surrogate decision-making committee (SDMC) or a
court.150
If the person is eighteen or older, but lacks capacity to under-
stand appropriate disclosures regarding proposed professional
medical treatment, and no guardian or health care agent has been
appointed, informed consent shall be obtained from one of the
surrogates listed, in the order stated:
(2) an actively involved spouse;
(3) an actively involved parent;
(4) an actively involved adult child;
(5) an actively involved adult sibling;
(6) an actively involved adult family member;
(7) the Consumer Advisory Board for the Willowbrook Class
(only for class members it fully represents); or
(8) a surrogate decision-making committee (SDMC) or a
court.151
There is no standard for decision-making by the identified surro-
gate set out in the OPWDD regulation, nor is there any duty im-
posed on the surrogate to consult with the person on whose behalf
the surrogate is providing informed consent.
End-of-life decision-making, also known as the withholding or
removal of life-sustaining treatment, is governed by the provisions
of the Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retarda-
tion (the “HCDA-MR”).152 The HCDA-MR affords both court-ap-
pointed guardians,153 as well as “qualified family members” who do
not need to be court-appointed guardians, the authority to consent
to medical treatment, including but not limited to the withholding
or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment.154 The HCDA-MR pro-
149 Family member is defined as “Any party related by blood, marriage, or legal
adoption.” Id. § 633.99(bf).
150 Id. § 633.11(a)(1)(iii)(a).
151 Id. § 633.11(a)(1)(iii)(b)
152 See N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b (McKinney’s Supp. 2007), 2002 N.Y.
Lawsch. 500, S4622-B, A8466-D, signed on September 17, 2002.
153 The New York Court of Appeals has held that the HCDA-MR applies not only to
guardians appointed after its effective date (Mar. 17, 2003), but to all guardians re-
gardless of when appointed. See In re. M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437 (2006).
154 Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(1)(a).
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vides for surrogate decision-making on the withholding or with-
drawal of medical treatment for persons with developmental
disabilities which either include mental retardation or result in
similar impairment of intellectual functioning or adaptive behav-
ior.155 If there is no guardian, a surrogate decision maker will be
appointed from a list of priorities:
(1) Article 17-A guardian
(2) an actively involved spouse
(3) an actively involved parent
(4) an actively involved adult child
(5) an actively involved adult sibling
(6) an actively involved adult family member
(7) The Consumer Advisory Board for the Willowbrook Class
(only for class members it fully represents): or
(8) a surrogate decision-making (SDMC) or a court.156
The surrogate is empowered to make any and all decisions to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.157 The surrogate is
required to base all advocacy and health care decision-making
solely and exclusively on the best interests of the person with
mental retardation or developmental disabilities and,158 “when rea-
sonably known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence,” on the
wishes of the person with mental retardation or developmental dis-
abilities, including moral and religious beliefs.159
The statute specifically provides that if the PWIDD objects to
the surrogate’s decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, the surrogate’s decision will be suspended pending judi-
cial review, except if the suspension would be likely to result in the
death of the person with mental retardation or developmental disa-
155 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750(1).
156 Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b(1)(a); 14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
§§ 633.10(a)(7)(iv), 633.11(a)(1)(b).
157 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1750-b.
158 An assessment of the best interests of the person with mental retardation or
developmental disabilities shall include consideration of five factors: (1) the dignity
and uniqueness of every person; (2) the preservation, improvement or restoration of
the health of the person; (3) the relief of the suffering of the person by means of
palliative care (care to reduce the person’s suffering) and pain management; (4) the
unique nature of artificially provided nutrition or hydration, and the effect it may
have on the person; and (5) the entire medical condition of the person. In addition, a
surrogate’s health care decisions may not be influenced by a presumption that the
person with mental retardation or developmental disabilities is not entitled to the full
and equal rights, equal protection, respect, medical care and dignity afforded to
other persons, nor by financial considerations of the surrogate. Id. § 1750-b(2)(b).
159 Id. § 1750-b(2)(a).
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bilities.160 OPWDD regulations and the HCDA-MR thus provide
family members some power, in limited circumstances, to make
healthcare decisions for a PWIDD without the necessity of a pro-
ceeding under 17-A.
V. RETHINKING 17-A THROUGH TWO DIFFERENT LENSES
A. The Civil Rights/Procedural Due Process/Civil Liberties Lens
Had the legislature’s 1990 direction been followed to comple-
tion, any reconsideration of 17-A would have involved an analysis
roughly similar to that which informed guardianship reform at the
time. In the same way in which procedural guarantees were incor-
porated into the Adult Guardianship Statute, Art. 81, a reformed
17-A would be expected to include those guarantees, including the
right to a hearing; to presence at that hearing; to call witnesses and
cross examine; to an enhanced burden of proof, namely clear and
convincing evidence; to specific findings on the record; to the pri-
vacy of medical records and the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination; to periodic reporting and review; and to an ave-
nue for modification and/or termination in which the burden of
proof was squarely on the opponent of such relief. In addition, the
constitutional and potentially statutory161 imperative of least re-
strictive intervention which so permeates Art. 81 would necessarily
imbue the requirements for guardianship, the obligation to explore
and exhaust less restrictive alternatives, and a non-waivable prefer-
ence for limited or tailored guardianship. All of these were aspects
of the “first round” of guardianship reform.162
Since that “first round,” however, the movement for reform
has continued,163 and there are several widely acknowledged subse-
160 Id. § 1750-b(5).
161 See discussion of the potential impact of the ADA on guardianship law, Saltz-
man, supra note 128.
162 As illustrated by, e.g., the Uniform Guardianship Protective Proceedings Act
(UGPPA), Prefatory Note (1998). These include the Standards of Practice of the Na-
tional Guardianship Association adopted in 2007, available at www.guardianship.org/
documents/standards_of_practice.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/QQ4R-GQMX and the Yokohama Declaration of the First World Congress
on Guardianship, available at http://www.international-guardianship.com/pdf/IGNY-
okohama_Declaration_2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). The Commission on Na-
tional Probate Standards has promulgated standards for courts, Nat’l Probate Court
Standards (Comm’n on Nat’l Probate Court Standards & Advisory Comm. on Inter-
state Guardianships 1993) (revised 1999) (upcoming review in process).
163 A useful summary of state actions to reform existing guardianship laws in a vari-
ety of areas, from pre-adjudication issues, mediation in contested guardianships, qual-
ification of guardians, to post-appointment monitoring, is found in COMM’N ON LAW
& AGING, AM. BAR ASSOC., STATE ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION: DIRECTIONS OF
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quent sources that ought to be considered in any rethinking of 17-
A. Foremost among these are the recommendations of the Third
National Guardianship Summit, which grew out of an invitation-
only conference of national guardianship experts held in Salt Lake
City in 2011.164 The Uniform Law Commissioners have begun a
process to reconsider the UGPPA in light of those
recommendations.165
Among the Summit Recommendations that go farther than
the UGPPA and most “reform” guardianship statutes, including
Art. 81, are recommendations that:
• In healthcare decision-making, the guardian should maxi-
mize the participation of the person (55.1) and encourage
and support the individual in understanding the facts and
directing a decision. (55.2).166
• In residential decision-making, the guardian should utilize a
person-centered plan that seeks to fulfill the person’s goals,
needs and preferences, and emphasizes her/his strengths,
skills and abilities to the fullest extent in order to favor the
least restrictive setting. (56.4).
More recently, a conference held at Cardozo Law School
brought together attorneys, advocates, court personnel, judges,
and service providers “to foster dialogue and develop consensus
about the next wave of guardianship reform in the state.”167 Rec-
REFORM 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bifocal/vol_35/
issue_2_dec2013/2013_guardianship.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/XK9M-JAZU. Similar compilations exist for every year since 2004.
164 The recommendations are published in a symposium issue of the Utah Law
Review, Julia R. Nack, Carolyn L. Dessin, & Judge Thomas Swift, Creating & Sustaining
Interdisciplinary Guardianship Committees, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157 (2012), and are also
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/
2011_aging_gship_sumt_stmnt_1111v2.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited May 9, 2015).
165 See David English, Chair, Am. Bar Assoc. on Law and Aging, Presentation at the
Third World Congress on Adult Guardianship (Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://
www.guardianship.org/IRL/Resources/Handouts/Beyond%20Substituted%20Judg
ment%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
HCP2-PD3R.
166 This recommendation has been seen as moving traditional guardianship law
toward supported decision-making, insofar as it differs significantly from formulations
like “taking the person’s wishes and desires into consideration.” Changing Paradigms,
supra note 49, at 139, n.207.
167 THE GUARDIANSHIP CLINIC, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, GUARDIAN-
SHIP IN NEW YORK: DEVELOPING AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE, REPORT OF THE CARDOZO
SCHOOL OF LAW CONFERENCE 4 (2012), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/
default/files/GuardianshipReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UXL6-3WEM. Al-
though the conference focused on Art. 81, the Report notes that “some of the recom-
mendations bear on Article 17-A guardianships as well.” Id.
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ommendation 4 was to “Promote Alternatives to Guardianship and
Create a Guardianship Diversion Program.” The group assigned to
this issue noted, “Guardianship is a last resort. Yet, there was wide-
spread recognition that guardians are sometimes appointed when
less restrictive alternatives would address unmet needs.”168
Other relevant recommendations included “Screen All Poten-
tial Guardians Up-Front” (Recommendation 10); “Evaluate Guard-
ianships Regularly to Determine if They Should Be Terminated”
(Recommendation 7); and, creating a segue to the other lens
through which 17-A might be re-thought, “Explore Replacing
Guardianship with Supported Decision-Making Models” (Recom-
mendation 5).169
B. Other State Statutes On Guardianship for PWIDDS
There is one additional area that might be profitably explored
in a traditional, due process-based reconsideration of 17-A, that of
the few other states that have statutes dealing separately with
guardianship for this population (California, Connecticut, Idaho
and Michigan).170 Those statutes all require specific attention to
the individual’s functional limitations rather than her or his diag-
nosis, seek to authorize only the most limited form of guardianship
sufficient to address otherwise current needs,171 and obligate the
guardian to seek support to develop and maximize the individual’s
functioning.172
168 Id. at 7.
169 Interestingly, the group that developed this recommendation also proposed
“developing a lawsuit to challenge the validity of Article 17-A guardianships, which
have been widely recognized as not comporting with all the due process and rights-
based principle incorporated in Article 81.”
170 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1801, 1821-23, 1828.5, 1830, 1850.5, 1860.5, 1872, 1890-91,
1952 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-669 to -684 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 15-5-301 to -318 (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.500-.800 (2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§330.1600 -1644 (West 2014) (guardianship for the developmen-
tally disabled).
171 For example, the California statute permits the appointing court to allow the
person for whom limited conservatorship (guardianship) is sought, to “enter into
transactions . . . as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular con-
servatee.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 1873 (West 2014). The Law Revision Comments on this
section explain: “The court might, for example, permit the conservatee to enter into
specific types of transactions or transactions not exceeding specified amounts (such as
contracts not in excess of $500).” Id.
172 For example, closely adhering to the constitutional requirement of least restric-
tive means, the California statute (which uses the term “conservator” rather than
guardian) provides:
A limited conservator of the person or of the estate, or both, may be
appointed for a developmentally disabled adult. A limited conservator-
ship may be utilized only as necessary to promote and protect the well
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The California statutory scheme is particularly strong in its
provisions for independent fact gathering, both for the initial de-
termination as to whether a conservator or guardian should be ap-
pointed173 and, in contradistinction to Art. 81,174 whether there is a
basis for continuing the conservatorship. The appointing court is
mandated to review the “appropriateness of the conservatorship
and whether the conservator is acting in the best interests of the
conservatee regarding the conservatee’s placement; quality of care,
including physical and mental treatment; and finances” six months
after the initial appointment, one year later, “and annually thereaf-
ter.”175 The court is, therefore, actively engaged not only in ensur-
ing the conservatee’s well being, but in determining whether
changes have occurred such that a conservatorship is no longer the
being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage the develop-
ment of maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual,
and shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s
proven mental and adaptive limitations. The conservatee of the limited
conservator shall not be presumed to be incompetent and shall retain
all legal and civil rights except those which by court order have been
designated as legal disabilities and have been specifically granted to the
Institutions Code, that developmentally disabled citizens of this state re-
ceive services resulting in more independent, productive, and normal
lives is the underlying mandate of t his division in its application to
adults alleged to be developmentally disabled.
Id. § 1801. Similarly, Michigan provides:
(1) Guardianship for individuals with developmental disability shall be
utilized only as is necessary to promote and protect the well-being of the
individual, including protection from neglect, exploitation, and abuse;
shall take into account the individual’s abilities; shall be designed to
encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and indepen-
dence in the individual; and shall be ordered only to the extent necessi-
tated by the individual’s actual mental and adaptive limitations.
(2) If the court determines that some form of guardianship is neces-
sary, partial guardianship is the preferred form of guardianship for an
individual with a developmental disability.
MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1602 (West 2014).
173 When a petition for limited conservatorship is filed, the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought is, if s/he consents, to be examined by a regional center in
accordance with Cal. Prob. Code § 1827.5; if the conservatee withholds the consent to
be assessed by the regional center, the court shall determine the reason for such
withholding. Id. § 1828.5(a)(5).
174 While under Art. 81’s reporting requirements, the guardian is supposed to ad-
vise whether the guardianship should continue, the court, through the court exam-
iner, has only the guardian’s word, which may or may not accurately describe the
situation.
175 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1850(a)(1)-(2). The court may set any subsequent review at
two years, but if it does so, in the interim, a court examiner must make an investiga-
tion including an unannounced visit to the conservatee, and file a report as to
whether, inter alia, “the conservatorship still appears to be warranted.” Id.
§ 1850(a)(2).
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least restrictive alternative, and that it should be terminated or
modified.
Significantly, the independent court investigator is required to
inform the conservatee of her or his right to petition for termina-
tion of the conservatorship and to determine whether she or he
wishes to do so.176 The investigator is also required to issue a re-
port, prior to the court’s review, as to “whether the present condi-
tion of the conservatee is such that the terms of the [appointing]
order should be modified or the order revoked.”177
Michigan takes a somewhat different approach to ensuring
that continuation of a guardianship remains the least restrictive
means. In addition to a requirement that the appointing court ver-
bally inform the PWID of his or her “right . . . to request at a later
date his or her guardian’s dismissal or a modification of the guardi-
anship order,” the person for whom a guardian has been ap-
pointed is also entitled to “a written statement . . . indicating his or
her rights pursuant to [the section on termination and modifica-
tion] and specifying the procedures to be followed in petitioning
the court.”178
The burden to initiate termination however, is not, however,
left solely to the person under guardianship or those acting on her
or his behalf. By statute, all guardianships of PWIDDS are limited
to five years;179 if the guardianship is to continue, a new petition
for guardianship has to be filed, and a hearing held, with all the
attendant due process protections, including the imposition of a
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence180 on the propo-
nent of the guardianship.181 And, it should be noted, when guardi-
anship—or renewal of guardianship—is sought, Michigan offers
another protection to the PWID, the right to assigned counsel paid
for by the state.182 Despite all the protections contained the Michi-
gan statute, one of its authors, Dohn Hoyle, Executive Director of
The Association for Retarded Children (ARC) Michigan, notes the
inconsistency of its application, and is, instead, strongly advocating
176 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1851(a).
177 Id. For a more extensive description and discussion of the California statute, see
Melinda Hunsaker, Limited Conservatorships: A Delicate Balance, 50 ORANGE CNTY. LAW-
YER 26 (2008).
178 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1634.
179 Id. § 330.1626(2).
180 Like California, and Art. 81, Michigan imposes this enhanced burden of proof.
MICH. COMP. LAWS §330.1618(4).
181 MICH. COMP. L. SERV. §330.1626(3).
182 Id. § 330.1615.
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for a human rights based supportive decision-making regime.183
The guardianship/conservatorship statutes of other states that
deal specifically with PWIDDS should thus be instructive and valua-
ble in any rethinking of 17-A, especially insofar as they provide, in
muscular fashion, either through mandatory periodic review or
time-limited guardianship, that the twin imperatives of least restric-
tive means and the protection and well being of the person under
guardianship are being met.
C. The Human Rights Lens
Passage of the CRDP, and its ratification by more than 120
nations, has spurred a movement away from traditional guardian-
ship and substituted decision-making, to a new model of autonomy
and self-determination, based on supported decision-making.184
The movement has, necessarily, involved two separate projects: one
to collect existing models of supported decision-making and to
plan and create pilot projects around the world; and, second, to
develop and propose new legislation consistent with Article 12 and
premised in the human right of legal capacity.185 These efforts are
useful in understanding supported decision-making and in imagin-
ing how it might be incorporated in New York law grounded in a
human rights model.186
183 DOHN HOYLE, THE ARC MICHIGAN, RETHINKING GUARDIANSHIP, n.d., http://www
.arcmi.org/pdf/Rethinking%20Guardianship%20MAF%20-%20Michigan.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BRC6-VLHC; See also personal
communication with Dohn Hoyle, on file with author.
184 As Professor Arlene Kanter has written: “Instead of paternalistic guardianship
laws, which substitute a guardian decision for the decision of the individual, the
CRPD’s supported decision-making model recognizes first, that all people have the
right to make decisions and choices about their own lives.” Arlene Kanter, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities and Its Implications for the
Rights of Elderly People Under International Law, 25 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 527, 563 (2009); see
also, Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Sup-
ported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (Winter 2012).
185 For an example of a planning process to bring a State Party’s laws into compli-
ance with Article 12, see Elizabeth Kumandia, The Kenya National Commission on
Human Rights and the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, How to Implement
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities Regarding Legal Capacity
in Kenya: A Briefing Paper (June 2013), available at http://www.knchr.org/portals/o/
grouprightsreports/briefing%20on%20legal%20capacity-disability%rights.pdf.
186 The two leading theorists of Canadian law reform on legal capacity, Michael
Bach and Lana Kerzner, have suggested three main kinds of supports that could or
should be provided for decision-making consistent with Art. 12: supports to assist in
formulating one’s purpose; supports to explore the range of choices and make a deci-
sion; supports to engage in the decision-making process with other parties to make
agreements where one’s decision requires this; and supports to act on the decision
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It is important, however, first to understand the concept of
supported decision-making, and the various models it may take.
Quite simply, it begins with an understanding that no one makes
decisions, especially important decisions like where to live, whether
to have a particular medical treatment, or who to marry, entirely
alone, or in a vacuum. Ordinary citizens seek information from
others, consult, and solicit opinions. PWIDDS similarly utilize sup-
port in making choices and decisions, but because of their disabili-
ties, may require different kinds, and a greater degree of support—
to have information made available to them in a way they under-
stand, to consider and weigh consequences, and, for PWIDDS with
communicative disabilities, to make their wishes known.187
As the Committee on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities
notes in the first General Comment:
Support is a broad term that encompasses both informal and
formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity. For
example, persons with disabilities may choose one or more
trusted support persons to assist them in exercising their legal
capacity for certain types of decisions, or may call on other
forms of support, such as peer support, advocacy (including self
advocacy support, or assistance with communication).
The Comment also notes that:
For many persons with disabilities, the ability to plan in advance
is an important form of support . . . A choice of various forms of
advance planning mechanisms can be provided . . . but all op-
tions should be non-discriminating. Support should be provided
to an individual where desired to complete an advanced plan-
ning document.188
Support systems also can, and quite frequently do, grow quite
one has made, and to meet one’s obligations, under any agreement made for that
purpose. Michael Bach & Lana Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the
Right to Legal Capacity (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/
bach-kerzner.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M53F-U8RL.
187 The First General Comment notes that “[s]upport can . . . constitute the devel-
opment and recognition of diverse, non-conventional means of communication, espe-
cially for those who use non-verbal forms of communication to express their will and
preference.” No.1 at ¶17. General Comment, supra note 58. For a discussion of a
variety of forms of supported decision-making and a call for more research in the
area, see Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumental, & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-
Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1121-25
(2013).
188 The significance of the “non-discriminating” and “support” language with re-
spect to advanced planning requires moving away from traditional requirements of
“mental capacity” necessary for, e.g., creating a valid power of attorney or healthcare
directive, using, if necessary, supports to make an individual’s “will and preference”
known. This, together with a “trusting relationship,” is the basis for representation
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informally, in ways that may eliminate189 or limit the need for
guardianship.190 The now well-publicized story of Jenny Hatch
demonstrates how a young Virginia woman with Down Syndrome
lived safely and successfully in the community with a support net-
work of friends, co-workers and service providers for twenty-seven
years. An accident that caused her mother and stepfather to bring
a guardianship proceeding resulted in the denial of her right to
choose where and with whom to live, her job, and contact with her
friends and supporters. Fortunately, her plight came to the atten-
tion of Quality Trust, an advocacy organization in D.C. which, in a
six-day trial, with expert witnesses, persuaded a Virginia judge to
remove her parents, and appoint as guardian, for one year only,
two of her supporters, to work with her on supported decision-
making.191 Happily, Jenny’s guardianship was entirely terminated
in August, 2014.192 As a result of the publicity around Jenny’s story,
Quality Trust has created the Jenny Hatch Justice Project, which
collects and disseminates information about supported decision-
making.
One model of supported decision-making, pioneered in Brit-
ish Columbia Canada, involves “representation agreements” by
which a PWIDD names one or more persons to assist her or him in
making particular kinds of decisions.193 The support persons do
not make decisions for the PWIDD, and if there is disagreement,
the PWIDD’s choice prevails. The PWIDD may also cancel the
agreement at will. For this model to work, however, that is to afford
agreements under British Columbia law. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. Ch.
405 (1996).
189 In re Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d 570 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2012), the court terminated
a 17-a guardianship on a finding that a support network had grown up around the
person under guardianship such that she was able—with their support—to make her
own decisions, and so no longer required a guardian.
190 See, e.g., the story of a Texas woman with Down Syndrome whose support net-
work convinced a judge to replace her state agency guardian with her supporter/
foster care provider, in anticipation of terminating the guardianship completely.
Robin Thorner, Challenging Guardianship and Pressing for Supported Decision-Making for
Individuals With Disabilities, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW (Jan. 7,
2014), http://stage.povertylaw.org/content/challenging-guardianship-and-pressing-
supported-decision-making-individuals-disabilities.
191 Materials and press about Jenny’s story are available at http://www.jen-
nyhatchjusticeproject.org/trial, archived at http://perma.cc/93GJ-2GB4.
192 Don Dahler, Woman with Down Syndrome Becomes Icon for Disabled, CBSNEWS.COM
(Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-with-down-syndrome-be-
comes-icon-for-disabled/.
193 Different people, or groups of people might be chosen for different kinds of
decisions, like financial, residential, healthcare, etc. R.S.B.C. 1996 Chapter 405, Part
2.
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the PSWIDD her or his right to have her or his decisions acted
upon, third parties, like financial institutions, healthcare providers,
landlords, etc. have to be willing—or required—to recognize those
decisions; this is where legislation is necessary to facilitate and en-
force supported decision-making.
While all of this may seem Utopian, there are at least partial
models in existence in Canada and several European countries.194
Thoughtfully planned pilot projects have been successful in Bulga-
ria195 and Australia.196 Similarly, there is proposed legislation,197 a
set of principles for legislation,198 and actually enacted legisla-
194 See, e.g., Changing Paradigms, supra note 49, at 140-52 for a discussion of Sweden,
Germany, and several provinces in Canada (British Columbia, Manitoba, Yukon, and
Alberta).
195 For materials on this project, which was funded by the Open Society Founda-
tion, see Bulgarian Ctr. For Not-For-Profit Law, http://www.bcnl.org/en/nav/40-anal-
yses.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JN7T-JTAE. It is particularly inspiring as it
involved a number of PWIDDS who had long been institutionalized in Bulgaria’s hor-
rendous “hospitals” and who, with the aid of support, are now living and functioning
successfully in the community.
196 Margaret Walker, Evaluation of the Supported Decision-Making Project, Office of the
Public Advocate (South Australia) (Muirgen Nominees Pty. Ltd., 2012), available at
http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/files/batch1376447055_final_supported_decision_making
_evaluation.pdf.
197 A multi-year effort in Canada has produced a detailed legislation proposal, for
the Law Commission of Ontario, Bach & Kerzner, supra note 186; see Policy Document
Submitted to Justice Aims to Aid People with Intellectual Disabilities, NFLD. ASS’N OF CMTY.
LIVING, http://www.nlacl.ca/news/article/getting-power-make-decisions-policy-docu
ment-submi. See Shih-Ning Then, Evaluation and Innovation in Guardianship Laws: As-
sisted Decision-Making, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 133 (2013), for an extensive discussion of
proposals for legislative reform in Australia.
198 E.g., Ctr. of Disability Law and Policy, Essential Principles: Irish Legal Capacity Law,
NAT’L UNIV. OF IRELAND GALWAY (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.nuigalway.ie/
cdlp/d ocuments/principles_web.pdf (the National University of Ireland Galway
Center of Disability Law and Policy created a “Principles and Key Issues for Capacity
Legislation” after a year of extensive consultation with stakeholders). Its principles
and key issues include:
The law must protect people’s rights to make decisions about all aspects
of their lives . . . [for example] healthcare, finances, relationships and
where and with whom to live.
People who need support to make decisions have a right to be provided
with that support by the state, e.g. advocate supports should be recog-
nized and assist the person in understanding options and expressing
their “will and preference.”
Reasonable accommodation should be made to help the person under-
stand the decision. Different ways of providing information must be ex-
plored (including sign language, alternative communication, flexibility
with regard to time and location for delivering information . . ., etc.).
There should be a range of advocacy supports including state-appointed
advocates with statutory powers, as well as other forms of individual ad-
vocacy (e.g., citizen advocacy, peer advocacy, self-advocacy support).
Decisions made by someone else is [are] a last resort when all supports
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tion199 that incorporates supported decision-making to a greater or
lesser degree.
Work on supported decision-making, legal capacity and guard-
ianship is not only international, it is very much alive and thriving
in the U.S.200 and in New York.201 In 2012, the A.B.A. Commissions
on Disability Rights (CDR) and on Law and Aging (COLA) spon-
sored an invitational, interdisciplinary Roundtable, Beyond Guardi-
anship: Supported Decision-Making by Persons with Intellectual
Disabilities, funded in part by the New York Community Trust.202
The Roundtable noted the need for a central body to collect infor-
mation and best practices on supported decision-making, and to
do policy advocacy and strategy around legislative reform.203
In May 2014, the U.S. Administration for Community Living
(ACL)204 announced a five-year grant to create a Supported Deci-
have been considered (facilitated decision-making). It should only ap-
ply for specific decisions and for the length of time necessary for that
purpose.
See, e.g., Czech Republic Enacts Legal Capacity Law Reform
199 See Eilionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capac-
ity: Fact, Fiction or Fantasy, 32 BERKELY J. INT’L L. 134, 144-146 (2014) (discussing legis-
lation adopted or proposed in countries including Canada, India, and Ireland); see
also Legal Capacity in Europe: A call to Action to Governments and to the EU, MENTAL DISA-
BILITY ADVOCACY CTR. (2013), available at http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/le-
gal_capacity_in_europe.pdf, for a discussion of the legislation in Czechoslovak
Republic that has abolished plenary guardianship and introduced alternatives to
guardianship such as supported decision-making.
200 See CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://ww.centerforpublicrep.org/litigation-
and-major-cases/supported-decision-making (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), for informa-
tion about the first planned pilot project on supported decision-making that is cur-
rently underway in Northampton, Mass., as a joint venture between the Center for
Public Representation and Nonotuck Resource Associates. See, e.g., Czech Republic En-
acts Legal Capacity Law Reform (Feb. 12, 2012), available at www.mdac.org/en/news/
czech-republic-enacts-legal-capacity-law-reform, archived at http://perma.cc/V8S4-
QTGM (“[N]ew law introduced support [for] decision-making as an alternative to the
guardianship system.”).
201 New York State’s new P&A, Disability Rights New York, is proposing a pilot pro-
ject on supported decision-making as well as a project on restoration of rights (utiliz-
ing supported decision-making) for persons currently under 17-A guardianships (on
file with author). Disability Rights New York, the Protection and Advocacy organiza-
tion for New York State, with the Developmental Disability Planning Council, will be
funding a three-to-five year pilot program on supported decision-making.
202 See Beyond Guardianship: Supported Decision-Making by Individuals with Intellectual
Disabilities: A Short Summary from the 2012 National Roundtable, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/mental_physical_disability/
SDMRoundtable_Summary.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XV2L-
Y6SY (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
203 Id.
204 ACL is a newly created body within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services that incorporates the Administration on Intellectual and Development Disa-
bilities (AIDD) and the Administration on Aging (AOA).
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sion Making Technical Assistance and Resource Center. According
to ACL, “[s]upported decision making is a process that provides
individuals, including older adults and people with 1/DD assis-
tance to understand the situations and choices they face, so they
can make decisions for themselves. The process is an alternative to
and an evolution from guardianship.”205 Specifically citing and em-
bracing the CRPD and Article 12, ACL continues:
By declaring “legal capacity” for all people, the CRPD separates
a person’s cognitive and communicative abilities from this basic
right. In other words, all people, regardless of their disability or
cognitive abilities have the right to make decisions and have
those decisions implemented. These concepts have helped in-
form and frame the conversation around developing the sup-
ported decision-making process.206
The purpose of the Center on Supported Decision Making is to:
[D]ocument and disseminate successful decision-making prac-
tices; conduct research to fill data and information gaps; de-
velop training materials and provide technical assistance to ACL
networks on SDM issues, including youth transition; develop a
strategy that measures and demonstrates the impact of sup-
ported decision-making on the lives of people with I/DD and
older Americans; design and commence implementation of a
small grants demonstration program that awards funding to
four to seven community organizations . . .; and develop a
clearinghouse of existing materials and resources, academic
work and practices, success stories, and newly-developed re-
search and training materials, to be made available to the gen-
eral public.”207
In August 2014, the grant was awarded to a consortium
headed by Quality Trust, the entity responsible for Jenny Hatch
case,208 and including the Autistic Self Advocacy Network
(ASAN).209 Now up and running, the Center has become a major
resource for information about supported decision-making and an
205 Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. Admin. for Cmty. Living., Supported Decision
Making, HHS-2014-ACL-AIDD-DM-0084, 6 (2014), available at http://www.grants.gov/
web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=256168 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/4AQV-A2XF.
206 Id. at 7.
207 Id. at 1.
208 See infra p. 59.
209 Admin. for Cmty. Living, Preserving the Right to Self-Determination: Supported Deci-
sion-Making, ACL BLOG (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.acl.gov/NewsRoom/blog/2015/
2015_01_28.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/VM22-A8X3.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 45 22-OCT-15 12:37
2015] REVISITING S.C.P.A 17-A 331
instigator of legislative reform from a human rights perspective.210
There are a variety of other U.S.-based resources for re-consid-
eration of 17-A in light of the CRPD, including materials developed
by Michigan ARC,211 a well planned restoration of rights project
incorporating supported decision-making, now in its second year
in Florida,212 and efforts toward legislative reform including those
in Texas and Virginia.213 And, as a superb starting point, ASAN has
drafted model legislation, dealing with one area of decision-mak-
ing and avoiding the need for guardianship.214
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS
The Committee notes an “intermediate” approach that will be
proposed in the Uniform Law Commissioners’ forthcoming recon-
sideration of the UGGPA.215 Drawing in part on the New York Sur-
rogate’s Court decision in In re Dameris L.,216 the existing UGPPA
would be amended to specifically include supported decision-mak-
ing as an alternative that must be attempted before guardianship
may be considered or imposed.
210 See the impressive collection of materials at www.supporteddecisionmaking
.org/research_library.
211 HOYLE, supra note 183.
212 Restoration of Capacity Study and Work Group Report, FLORIDA DEVELOPMENTAL DISA-
BILITIES COUNCIL, (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.guardianship.org/IRL/Re-
sources/Handou ts/Charting%20a%20New%20Course_Restoration%20Report.pdf.
This project is sponsored by H.H.S., AIDD and the Florida Development Disabilities
Council, Inc., with significant input from the Florida judiciary.
213 Guardianship Reform and Supported Decision Making Group Relating to a
Supported Decision-Making Agreement: A Policy Paper in Bill Format (2014) (on file
with committees). See Peter Blanck & Jonathan G. Martinis, “The Right to Make
Choices’’: The National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making, 3 Inclusion 24-33
(2015), available at http://bbi.syr.edu/publications/2015/SDM_Overview.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/4NS3-M9PF.
214 Model Legislation: An Act Relating to the Recognition of a Supported Health Care Deci-
sion-Making Agreement for Adults With Disabilities, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK
(2014), http://autisticadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ASAN-Suppor
ted-Decisionmaking-Model-Legislature.pdf.
215 Perils of Guardianships, supra note 55. See English, supra note 165.
216 In re Dameris L., 38 Misc.3d 570, 580 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2012), the Court wrote:
The internationally recognized right of legal capacity through sup-
ported decision making can and should inform our understanding and
application of the constitutional imperative of least restrictive alterna-
tive. That is, to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality, N.Y. Surr. Ct.
Proc. Act. § 17-A must be read to require that supported decision mak-
ing must be explored and exhausted before guardianship can be im-
posed or, to put it another way, where a person with an intellectual
disability has the ‘other resource’ of decision making support, that re-
source/network constitutes the least restrictive alternative, precluding
the imposition of a legal guardian.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 46 22-OCT-15 12:37
332 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:287
While not endorsing any particular approach or proposing
specific provisions in a rethinking of 17-A, the Committee em-
braces one imperative of the CRPD,217 the ACL proposal and new
National Center on Supported Decision-Making, and the decades
long disability rights movement—that the conversation must prom-
inently include PWIDDS. While lawyers, judges, providers, parents
and siblings, and academics all have important contributions to
make, the Committee urges meaningful inclusion of PWIDDS in
accordance with the slogan they brought to the U.N. working
group on the CRDP, and which has informed the work of self-advo-
cates for decades,218 “Nothing about us without us.” And, as the
discussion of language demonstrates, any reform effort must pay
serious attention to the necessity of “person-centered” terminology
that respects and enhances dignity.
It should also be noted that guardianship, or any legally sanc-
tioned form of substituted decision-making, is never entirely bene-
ficial. It is, therefore, important to consider the “downsides” of
guardianship for a PWIDDS. As one commentator has noted:
This loss of decision-making rights deprives individuals with dis-
abilities of numerous opportunities to participate in daily com-
munity life. For example, individuals under guardianship may
not be able to bank, shop, apply for jobs, or seek routine health
care without the participation and consent of the guardian. This
lack of autonomy can cause individuals under guardianship to
withdraw from community life and become disengaged from
management of their own affairs. Thus, disengaged, they also
lose opportunities to practice previously acquired decision-mak-
ing skills or build new ones.219
Whatever lens is employed, there must be concern for, and
provision to protect decision-making, whether for or by (with sup-
ports) PWIDDS, against abuse220 and/or exploitation.221 Although
the motivating principle of 17-A is the protection of vulnerable per-
sons, the existing statutory scheme is entirely devoid of any mecha-
217 CRPD, supra note 51, at §4(3). The CRPD requires that PWID’s be actively en-
gaged and included in its implementation.
218 For a general history of disability rights activism incorporating this principle, see
JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EM-
POWERMENT (2000).
219 Samantha Alexandra Crane, Is Guardianship Reform Enough? Next Steps in Policy
Reforms to Promote Self-Determination Among People With Disabilities, INTERNAT’L J. OF LAW
& AGING ___ (2014) (forthcoming) (citing Kohn, supra note 188, at 1119 n.27).
220 Potential abuse could be physical, sexual, or emotional.
221 Exploitation primarily, but not exclusively, applies to guardians (or supporters)
over financial matters.
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nisms to provide oversight or to ensure against abuse.222
Article 81 relies on court supervision, through an extensive re-
porting and review system—on paper—that may or may not be
working, especially in a period of shrinking court budgets and
competition for resources.223 But that system, even at its best, has
serious issues in terms of any real certainty about the protection of
those whose rights have been taken away and conferred on third
parties, giving them the power to act in ways that should be benefi-
cial, but may also be detrimental, to the needs of persons under
guardianship.
First, obviously, the system relies entirely on what guardians
report, with no provision for independent verification. Second, the
use of paid court examiners, whose compensation depends on the
size of the estate of the person under guardianship being reviewed,
raises serious equity issues. There is no necessary correlation be-
tween the needs or vulnerability to abuse of a person with substan-
tial financial resources and a frail elderly person on SSI living in
the community—or a nursing home—yet the funds available for
review vary tremendously.224 Finally, court examiners are chosen
almost entirely for their ability to review reports of property guardi-
ans, and are not screened for (nor do most possess) any expertise
in the issues relevant to evaluating guardians of the person, like
rehabilitation services, appropriate medication, community ser-
vices that enhance inclusion and participation, government bene-
fits availability, etc.
These defects of Art. 81’s monitoring system were pointed out
in a Report of this Association more than two decades ago,225 but
since that time virtually nothing has changed. That is, any hopes
that grafting the “protective provisions” of Art. 81 onto a replace-
222 As previously noted, there is absolutely no requirement that a 17-A guardian of
the person ever report to the court—or anyone else—once the appointment is made.
And, without reporting, there can be no oversight.
223 The statute was described as “revenue neutral” in order to secure its passage,
and has never provided any additional resources for court supervision. Although the
primary responsibility for review falls on external court examiners, it is the court’s
responsibility both to supervise them and then to review and act on their reports.
224 The incapacitated person (“IP”) shall pay for the examination of initial and
annual reports if her/his estate amounts to $5,000 or more; or otherwise, the ex-
penses is paid out of court funds. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.32(f). When the court ap-
points a counsel and/or referee for the purpose of protecting the IP’s interest and
assessing the immediate and final reports, the court has discretion to determine the
compensation for the counsel and referee. Id. § 81.33(e).
225 The Comm. on the Legal Problems of the Aging, Guardianship Monitoring in the
Supreme Court, 49 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y 604 (1994).
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ment for 17-A would provide meaningful protection against abuse,
neglect or exploitation are naı̈ve at best, and dishonest at worst.
The human rights lens explicitly calls for protection against
abuse and exploitation; drawing directly on provisions of the
CRPD. Article 12 requires:
States Parties all measures that relate to the exercise of legal ca-
pacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to pre-
vent abuse in accordance with international human rights law.
Such safeguards shall ensure that measure relating to the exer-
cise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of
the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence,
are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, ap-
ply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular re-
view by a competent, independent and impartial authority or
judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the de-
gree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and
interests.226
Article 16 provides, with more explicit obligations, for “Freedom
From Exploitation, Violence and Abuse.”227 Legislative proposals
to replace substituted decision-making228 with supported decision-
making and existing models incorporate provisions for protection,
generally focusing on the use of “monitors”229 but many questions
226 U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
Article 12, § 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.un
.org/esa/socdev/enable /documents/tccconve.pdf.
227 Id. Article 16, §§ 2, 3, 5, naming three types of measures which States Parties are
required to undertake to ensure assistance and support for persons with disabilities,
their families and caregivers, including information and education on how to avoid,
recognize and report instances of exploitation, violence and abuse, to ensure effective
monitoring by independent authorities, and to put in place effective legislation and
policies to ensure that instances of exploitation, violence and abuse are identified,
investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.
228 As two leading proponents of supported decision-making have written:
The key difference between safeguards for support model and those
which have existed in substitute decision-making regimes is that safe-
guards for support are based on the core principle of respect for the
individual’s will and preferences, no matter what level of decision-mak-
ing ability she holds. For example, in a support model there must be an
adjudication mechanism for challenging support people if they fail to
respect the will and preference of the individual. In contrast, adjudica-
tion in most current substituted decision-making regimes focuses on
“protecting” the individual and discovering what is in her “best inter-
est,” with little importance placed on her will and preference.
Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 199, at 152.
229 Statutory Framework for the Right to Legal Capacity and Supported Decision-Making,
THE CANADIAN ASS’N FOR CMTY. LIVING (Draft 2012), cited in The Roundtable Briefing,
AM. BAR ASS’N, 20 (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/mental_physical_disability/Roundtable_brief_10182012.authcheck
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remain. Among them:
To what extent, and how, will there be qualifications, standards
and screening for those serving in either a supportive or substi-
tuted decision-making role, including identifying and avoiding
existing and/or potential conflicts of interest?
In addition to, or in lieu of a required reporting system, should
there be a system of routine or targeted checks to ensure against
abuse by guardians or persons serving as supporters? What en-
tity would conduct such checks and how?  Who would pay for it?
How can PWIDDS have meaningful access to the court system to
challenge abusive practices or to end unnecessary restrictions
on their autonomy?
VII. CONCLUSION
SCPA 17-A, as it currently exists, discriminates against persons
with intellectual and developmental disabilities, denies procedural
and substantive due process to those for whom guardianship is
sought, and over whom guardianship is imposed, fails to honor or
promote autonomy, self-determination and dignity, and fails to
protect persons under guardianship from abuse, neglect and ex-
ploitation. The compelling need to address these issues, first raised
almost a quarter of a century ago, should be delayed no longer.
dam.pdf. It provides perhaps the most well-considered approach to protection from
abuse in its concept of designated “monitors.” It states:
Given that some people are at higher risk of neglect and abuse because
of the nature of their disability, isolation, or other factors, some provi-
sion should be in place to enable ‘monitors’ of supported decision-mak-
ing and representative decision-making arrangements to be appointed.
An appointment should be made only on request by an adult, sup-
porter, representative or where there are reasonable grounds to indi-
cate that this safeguard is required to ensure the decision-making
process with and around the adult maintains integrity . . . . A monitor
would be independent and act to ensure supporters and representatives
are fulfilling their statutory obligations.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-2\CNY204.txt unknown Seq: 50 22-OCT-15 12:37
